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ABSTRACT
In this essay I explore efforts at regulating race-related speech on publicly funded colleges and
universities. In the first section, I present the scope of the current debate about the topic: what
speech is, contexts in which it is found, etc. In the second section, I present the case for
unrestricted speech on campuses for the advancement of knowledge and social progress. The
third section addresses standard problem cases for free speech like the non-scientific nature of
racist epithets, existential threats to the university, and involuntary exposure to racist speech. The
fourth section explores arguments for regulating speech coming from critical race theorists and
those who question the cultural narrative surrounding speech these days. In the fifth section, I lay
bare the irreconcilable incompatibilities of free speech proponents and advocates of speech
restrictions in several areas. The conclusion points the way forward toward by calling attention
to the lingering questions about the values of knowledge and social progress.
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INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2017, University of Virginia graduate, Jason Kessler, organized a
“Unite the Right” event as a protest of Charlottesville’s removal of a statue of Confederate
General Robert E. Lee from the city’s “Emancipation Park.” The local chapter of Black Lives
Matter heard about the event months in advance and began planning counter protests against
what they imagined would be unacceptable and immoral hate speech. Word spread, and Kessler
was joined by Richard Spencer, a self-proclaimed political “identitarian” (i.e., a supporter of
white identity politics) and creator of the Alt Right, a group the New York Times describes as “a
coalition of old and new white supremacist groups [e.g., neo-Nazis, the Ku Klux Klan, neoConfederates, or independent militia members] connected by social media and emboldened by
the election of Donald J. Trump.”1 On the day of the protest, violence erupted between Alt Right
protesters and Black Lives Matter counterprotesters, and Spencer received some of the fallout:
“As we were going in, I was sprayed with Mace… Someone jumped out of the crowd and I got it
in the face.”2 In one particularly disturbing moment, a young member of Spencer’s group, James
Alex Fields, Jr., used a vehicle as a lethal weapon, driving a car into a group of counterprotesters. Fields killed one and injured nineteen. Reflecting later on the event, Spencer
described it as “a huge moral victory in terms of the show of force.”3

1

Richard Fausset and Alan Feuer, “Far-Right Groups Surge Into National View in Charlottesville,” in New York
Times (August 13, 2013). Online at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/us/far-right-groups-blaze-intonational-view-in-charlottesville.html.
2
Fausset and Feuer, “Far Right Groups.”
3
Fausset and Feuer, “Far Right Groups.”
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Similar events have taken place on college campuses throughout the country, sometimes
involving the same people. Two months after Charlottesville, Spencer planned to visit the
University of Florida, which caused such fear of violence and injury that Governor Rick Scott
declared a “state of emergency.”4 In preparation, the University of Florida and the city of
Gainesville spent well over half a million dollars on extra security for fear of a violent clash
between Spencer and his cohorts on one side and two thousand protesters on the other side.5
When Spencer finally took the stage on October 19, 2017, his voice was drowned out by yelling
protesters. The night devolved, and Spencer cut his allotted time short. Other colleges took a
different approach than the University of Florida, not even permitting Spencer to speak on their
campuses, like Ohio State University, which denied Spencer a platform by citing security
concerns.6
The problem addressed by this essay is the great conceptual divide on speech issues on
college campuses, especially on issues related to race. Universities do not have a unified vision
of what kinds of speech are acceptable and/or should be protected, and the fact that conference
papers, articles, books, and public lectures continue to argue the topic stands as evidence of the
fact that the issue is neither settled nor unimportant.7

4

Lori Rozsa and Susan Syrugla, “Florida Governor Declares State of Emergency in Advance of Richard Spencer
Event,” in The Washington Post (Oct. 16, 2017). Online at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/gradepoint/wp/2017/10/16/florida-governor-declares-state-of-emergency-in-advance-of-richard-spencer-event/.
5
Graham Lanktree, “Richard Spencer Shouted Down in Florida, Cuts His Speech Short,” in Newsweek (Oct. 20,
2017). Online at: https://www.newsweek.com/richard-spencer-shouted-down-florida-cuts-his-speech-short689182.
6
Associated Press, “Ohio State Sued over Refusal to Let White Nationalist Richard Spencer Speak,” in ABC News
Online (Oct. 22, 2017): Online at: http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/ohio-state-sued-refusal-whitenationalist-speak-50645877. See also Nick Roll, “Richard Spencer and a Tale of Two Publics,” in Inside
Higher Ed (October 16, 2017), Online at: https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/10/16/ohio-stateuniversity-cincinnati-diverge-how-answer-richard-spencer.
7
To note just five books that were published recently: Floyd Adams, The Soul of the First Amendment (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2017); Timothy Garton Ash, Free Speech: Ten Principles for a Connected
World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017); Erwin Chemerinsky and Howard Gillman, Free
Speech on Campus (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017); Sigal R. Ben-Porath, Free Speech on
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In this essay, I will present some arguments from both sides of the free speech debate and
some difficult cases to illustrate why the issue is unsettled. In laying out and comparing their
disparate views, I will suggest that no progress can or will be made in discussions about speech
because of intractable, fundamental disagreements about the context of the discussion and the
methodology appropriate to it. That is to say, there are strong disagreements about speech
restrictions because the foundations of both camps are rooted in different soils. Until those
assumptions are uprooted or replaced, the disagreement will continue.
The essay is divided into five sections. The first part defines the terms and boundaries of
the debate: what speech is, contexts in which it occurs, and the momentum of the conversation
regarding regulation of it. In the second section, I present the liberal argument for free speech,
which highlights the value of maximizing liberty for the advancement of human knowledge and
promoting social progress. (Here and throughout this essay, “liberal” refers to “liberty-valuing”
and “liberty-promoting,” not “politically liberal,” which I will refer to as the “left” or “far left.”)
The liberal will argue that schools that suppress any idea, word, or phrase – no matter how
hateful or bigoted – are forfeiting that which is their greatest asset: the free and open expression
of ideas. The third section problematizes this liberal argument through some problem cases,
conditions that are often mentioned to justify restrictive speech codes: the non-scientific nature
of racial epithets, existential threats, and involuntary exposure to racist speech. In the fourth
section, I will extend the critique of free speech to include critical race theorists and those who
question the concept of a “war on free speech.” This section will demonstrate that advocates for
speech restrictions contest the idea that there is “neutral” ground on which meaningful discourse
can take place. In the fifth section, I lay bare the irreconcilable and entrenched poles by

Campus (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017); and Keith Wittington, Speak Freely: Why
Universities Must Defend Free Speech (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018).
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evaluating the extent to which moderate proposals succeed in satisfying those on both sides.
Finally, in the Conclusion, I offer some remarks on the nature of inquiring into race-related
matters and how this, too, evidences an impasse.

7

THE UNIQUENESS OF SPEECH AND THE MOMENTUM OF THE DEBATE
This is a pivotal time in the history of speech debates. A recent Gallup Survey reveals
that present-day college students do not see a strong need to protect free speech, and the
momentum seems to be heading in the direction of more restrictions, not fewer. In that study,
“when forced to choose, a majority of students said that diversity and inclusivity were more
important than free speech.”8 Although the answers college students gave fragmented along
political and/or racial lines at times, “a majority of students in every demographic drew a line for
hate speech, saying that it does not deserve First Amendment protection.”9 Students are
increasingly unwilling to countenance racial stereotypes and slurs, and believe they should be
restricted. In situations where a speaker may offend with his/her words, many students support
“safe spaces for those who feel upset or threatened” while having other locations that can act as
“free speech zones where protests or partisan proselytizing is explicitly allowed.”10 College
students blame the cause of the outrage on the media, specifically social media, “with about two
in three saying that platforms like Facebook and Twitter should take responsibility to limit that
speech.”11 Finally, broader than campus speech debates, students in general “lost confidence in

8

Niraj Chokski, “What College Students Really Think About Free Speech,” in The New York Times (March 12,
2018): Online at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/12/us/college-students-free-speech.html.
9
Niraj Chokski, “What College Students Really Think About Free Speech,” online.
10
Niraj Chokski, “What College Students Really Think About Free Speech,” online.
11
Niraj Chokski, “What College Students Really Think About Free Speech,” online.
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the security of the five rights enumerated by the First Amendment,”12 of which free speech is one
example.13
Proponents of free speech argue that the desire for speech restrictions displays a
shortsightedness about all the kinds of speech that may be affected by such restrictions. In
addition to hate speech, the category of “speech” also includes written or published work,
demonstrations, arguments, counterarguments, etc. And these types of speech are found in a
variety of contexts: artistic endeavors, university lectures, public demonstrations, flag burnings,
picketing events, church services, community centers, etc.
However, advocates of speech restrictions compare United States policies with other
countries, and they encourage a rethinking of the First Amendment in light of speech codes
elsewhere. Simply put, other countries do not offer the leeway the United States does to speak
one’s mind without threat of repercussions, and they balance free speech against other social
goods. This point is noted by both Susan Brison and David van Mill. According to Brison, in
other countries, “free speech rights are constrained by other rights, such as the rights to dignity,
respect, and equality; and laws restricting hate speech, such as speech inciting racial hatred and
Holocaust denial, are relatively uncontroversial.”14 Van Mill agrees, arguing that “outside of the
United States of America speech does not tend to have a specially protected status and it has to
compete with other rights claims for our allegiance.”15 Other countries do not grant wide
protections when it comes to speech. In early 2018, for example, a man from Scotland taught his
dog to imitate a Nazi salute, which he recorded and posted to YouTube. The man was
12

Niraj Chokski, “What College Students Really Think About Free Speech,” online.
The results of this poll can be found directly at the Knight Foundation, who partnered with Gallup on this survey.
See their results here: https://www.knightfoundation.org/reports/free-expression-on-campus-what-collegestudents-think-about-first-amendment-issues.
14
Susan Brison, “Hate Speech,” in The International Encyclopedia of Ethics (H. LaFollette, ed.; Malden, MA:
Blackwell Publishing, 2013), 2332.
15
David van Mill, “Freedom of Speech,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 edition; E. N. Zalta,
ed.). Found online at: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/freedom-speech/.
13
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subsequently convicted of a hate crime.16 In consideration of the fact that the United States has a
decidedly liberal perspective on speech, “most Anglo-American philosophical writing about hate
speech has discussed whether – and, if so, why – this position is justified.”17
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution offers U.S. citizens several expressive
liberties. It reads as follows: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.” Because publicly-funded colleges and universities are bound to a greater
degree by the Constitution than private universities – where ideological or religious
commitments give Constitutional protections against governmental intervention – courts have
ruled that public universities cannot prioritize other values over and above the First Amendment
protections that speech is given unless the situation demands it. Further, the U.S. Supreme Court
has ruled that a public university ought not discriminate on the basis of what will be said.18 These
rulings do not require that university administrators, faculty, staff, and students accept ideas that
they find to be hateful and bigoted. Such pronouncements and protestations are entirely
reasonable, and helpful to demonstrate that a specific individual or institution does not stand for
that which is permitted under the banner of “free speech.”
Advocates of speech restrictions go further, however, than merely balancing speech
against other social goods; they seek to limit speech in major ways: “Our thesis is that
conventional First Amendment doctrine is most helpful in connection with small, clearly
16

Cleve R. Wootsen, Jr., “For weeks he trained a dog to do a Nazi salute. The man was just convicted of a hate
crime,” in The Washington Post (March 21, 2018). Online at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theintersect/wp/2018/03/21/for-weeks-he-trained-a-dog-to-do-a-nazi-salute-the-man-was-just-convicted-of-ahate-crime/?utm_term=.2ff7e9f06e4d.
17
Brison, “Hate Speech,” 2332.
18
See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957), Keyishian v. Board of Regents, State University of
New York, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), and Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
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bounded disputes,” not large scale matters, argue Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic.19 But
speech isn’t able to deal with more substantive problems, they assert, like “systemic social ills,
such as racism or sexism, that are widespread and deeply woven into the fabric of society. Free
speech, in short, is least helpful where we need it most.”20
If today’s college students take positions of power and responsibility in American society
in the years to come and follow through with limiting what can be said, the liberal points out that
such regulations could never decisively or pre-emptively thwart hate speech. This is due to the
uniqueness of speech itself, as noted by Van Mill.21 Unlike other restrictions on liberty,
governmental authorities cannot fully eradicate one’s freedom to speak. If a government were
serious about speed limits on highways, for example, it could prohibit auto manufacturers from
making vehicles capable of reaching speeds deemed too fast. The state could, in theory, remove
the ability of a person to drive, say, ninety miles per hour on public roads by removing the ability
of people to obtain vehicles capable of reaching that speed. Speech, however, is unable to be
regulated in quite the same way. Only if a state were to “remove our vocal cords” could they
prevent citizens from exercising this freedom, says Van Mill: “A government can limit some
forms of free expression by banning books, plays, films, etc., but it cannot make it impossible to
say certain things. The only thing it can do is punish people after they have spoken.”22
So the argument for regulating speech based on potential harms, from the liberal’s
perspective, would need to include a sufficient evidentiary basis for believing that regulations
and punishments would act as a sufficient deterrent against hate speech. But proponents of

19

Richard Delgado and Jean Stefrancic, “Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free
Expression Remedy the Systemic Social Ills?” in Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge, 225.
20
Richard Delgado and Jean Stefrancic, “Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free
Expression Remedy the Systemic Social Ills?” in Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge, 225.
21
Van Mill, “Freedom of Speech.”
22
Van Mill, “Freedom of Speech.”
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extreme speech regulations on college campuses do not accept that they themselves bear the
burden of proof, and some go further to suggest that a system that requires evidence and proof is
already inherently racist, evidence of a white, male, heteronormative bias (more on this below).
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THE CASE FOR FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS
In this section, I will provide three arguments from those favoring liberty on speech
issues: first, that maximizing liberty has inherent value; second, that maximizing liberty has
instrumental value insofar as it contributes to the advancement of knowledge; and third, that the
advancement of knowledge made possible by free speech contributes to social progress.
First, free speech is seen as an inherent good by some free speech proponents. Although
there is some debate on the motivations of the founding fathers,23 a general principle informing
their crafting of the First Amendment is that political liberty is a higher value than nearly every
other political value. Philip Pettit24 provides a helpful clarification that illustrates the nature of
freedom and why it is better than non-freedom. In response to those who argue that that freedom
is non-interference, i.e., that people are “free” when they can act according to their own wishes
without fear or threat of others interfering, Pettit suggests that this definition of freedom does not
go far enough. Not only should others not get in one’s way, but they should not be able to get
into one’s way. Freedom requires that “you must be able to exercise such basic or fundamental
liberties, as they are usually called, without having to answer to any master or dominus in your
23

Anthony Lewis, Freedom for the Thought that We Hate: A Biography of the First Amendment (New York: Basic
Books, 2010). Lewis is conspicuously silent on the Founders’ “original intent” or “original understanding,”
and instead argues that the meaning of the First Amendment is largely “judge-made” law of the past 100
years. See also the review by Richard Fallon, “Freeing Speech: How Judge-Made Law Gave Meaning to
the First Amendment,” in Harvard Magazine (May/June 2008), Online at:
https://harvardmagazine.com/2008/05/freeing-speech.
24
The Pettit texts used in this essay are: Phillip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1997), A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of
Agency (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of
Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), and Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a
Complex World (New York: Norton, 2014).
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life.”25 Freedom is a function not only of the actions of other people, but also of the powers of
other people. Freedom, to put the matter simply, is non-domination.
With speech issues, the First Amendment can act as a check on governmental domination
and provides the citizens of the United States the “right” to speak their minds. Speech is not
alone in this endeavor, however. The entire Constitution can be read as a plan to disperse power
widely so that no one person or branch rises to the level of a despot. Presumably, freedom of
speech limits abuses of power just as much as elections, term limits, the right to bear arms,
freedom of the press, and due process. The founders anticipated that people are going to use that
freedom in all sorts of ways: some bad, some good. Though some will use freedom poorly, that
does not make giving them the choice a bad thing. The worse thing, proponents of maximizing
liberty would say, is forcing a person to do or say or believe something. Liberty and autonomy
are seen as inherent goods by some who argue for unrestricted speech codes.
Free speech was seen by the founders of the United States, especially Madison, who
wrote the Bill of Rights, as a first freedom of paramount importance; it is so important, from the
liberal’s perspective, that we are willing to countenance evil remarks and offensive uses of it. We
put up with offensive speech, the argument goes, because that state of affairs in which people are
occasionally offended is preferable to living without freedom. This makes the First Amendment
protection analogous to the “free will” theodicy in philosophy of religion, according to which
God granted humans the freedom to choose their religious commitments. Giving them freedom
was preferable to a state of affairs in which liberty was non-existent. Moreover, although the
First Amendment protects speech against censorship, there is no such provision in the
Constitution stating the opposite. There is no enumerated “right to not be offended.” Even since

25

Pettit, Just Freedom, Kindle location: 73-74.
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the founders, subsequent court decisions have agreed that free speech should occupy a
“privileged position” among the rights (stretching back at least to Palko vs. Connecticut).
Second, the liberal views free speech as not only an inherent good but also an
instrumental one. One of the instrumental goods afforded by free speech is knowledge itself.
Proponents free speech on college campuses argue that the advancement of knowledge depends
on permitting any expression or concept to be advanced and debated. While it is entirely
reasonable to want to silence white supremacists and advocates of hate, liberals will argue that
advocates for censorship fail to recognize that only through more speech are these inferior ideas
ferreted out and discarded. When speech is unlimited, scholars are unafraid to turn over any
stone in search of the truth, as Thomas Jefferson said of the institution he founded in his
hometown of Charlottesville, the University of Virginia: “This institution will be based on the
illimitable freedom of the human mind. For here we are not afraid to follow truth wherever it
may lead, nor to tolerate any error so long as reason is left free to combat it.”26
The argument for free speech based on the advancement of knowledge has several
premises, each of which deserves mentioning and exploring. One of these premises is that the
advancement of knowledge depends on non-conformism and creativity, both of which are
possible in free speech contexts but blunted in conditions of censorship. This point is made by
John Stuart Mill in On Liberty, which he wrote in response to the threat of an old, monarchic
tyranny being replaced by a new kind of tyranny made possible by democratic governments,
what he called the “tyranny of the majority” (borrowing language from Tocqueville’s
Democracy in America). The masses could potentially coerce others through “compulsion and
control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or moral
26

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Roscoe (December 27, 1820). A. E. Bergh, ed., The Writings of Thomas
Jefferson (Washington, DC: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1907) vol. 15: 302. Summary
online at: https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/jefferson/75.html.
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coercion of public opinion.”27 The lack of diverse opinions is stifling, and it is broader than legal
issues: Christopher Macleod describes “moral coercion” as “informal mechanisms of social
pressure and expectation” that “could, in mass democratic societies, be all-controlling. Mill
worried that the exercise of such powers would lead to stifling conformism in thought, character,
and action.”28 When only one line of thinking dominates or hegemonically controls the
discussion, new ideas are not heard. Only freedom in thought and communication, the liberal
will argue, allows us to test views in public, subjecting them to public scrutiny and the informed
opinions of peers. We should begin with the presumption in favor of liberty, for Mill, because
freedom of speech, communication, and thought is vital for a society that desires to push its ideas
to their logical conclusions and evaluate alternative points of view.
Another premise on which the knowledge point rests is human intellectual fallibility.
Mill, again, offers a defense of this idea in On Liberty. It displays courage to welcome a diversity
of viewpoints, says Mill: if we do not have freedom of speech, “the price paid for this sort of
intellectual pacification is the sacrifice of the entire moral courage of the human mind.”29
Moreover, humans are deeply fallible creatures who need the corrective thinking of other free
people. Mill puts it this way: “That mankind are not infallible; that their truths, for the most part,
are only half-truths; that unity of opinion, unless resulting from the fullest and freest comparison
of opposite opinions, is not desirable, and diversity not an evil, but a good, until mankind are
much more capable than at present of recognizing all sides of the truth, are principles applicable
to men's modes of action, not less than to their opinions.”30

27

Mill, On Liberty, 13.
Christopher Macleod, “John Stuart Mill,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (E. N. Zalta, ed.; Fall 2018
edition). Online at: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/mill.
29
Mill, On Liberty, 40.
30
Mill, On Liberty, 68.
28
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These premises build upon one another and they create a third premise: If humans are
fallible, and if knowledge is the sort of thing that is progressive and advances over time, then
there are times when repressing an idea may distort the truth or prevent it from coming out. Mill
believes that unrestricted free speech should be the norm because it can lead to truth: “the
opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority may possibly be true,”31 but if a person
refuses to at least consider alternative points of view, s/he ignores the brute fact of his/her own
fallibility. And further, if a person is unwilling to consider unpopular views, this reveals much
about the insecurity with which they hold their positions. If a censor disallows free speech, s/he
reveals his/her deep intellectual insecurity by being threatened by the likelihood that the censor is
mistaken. Another way this might work, according to Mill, is this: we may not subject falsehoods
to scrutiny and, therefore, risk perpetuating untruth. The truth, for Mill, has usefulness for the
progression of humankind, and can emerge best in a context of absolute freedom of speech.32
Joel Feinberg33 presents a similar idea in the second volume of his magisterial Moral
Limits of the Criminal Law series, Offense to Others. He notes that while it is “important to each
individual to voice his own opinion about matters of public policy,” it is “also important to him
that he have fair access to the opinions and arguments of all his fellows, and important to the
whole community that all possible roads to truth be left open lest our leaders become committed
to insufficiently examined policies, with disastrous social consequences.”34 For Feinberg, these
other opinions include the ones we normally associate with bigotry and hate: “It is necessary to
emphasize here… that unpopular, unorthodox, and extreme opinions, no less than any others,
31

Mill, On Liberty, 21.
Mill, On Liberty, ch. 2.
33
The Feinberg texts included in this essay are: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (4 vols.; New York: Oxford
University Press, 1984-1988), including Harm to Others, Offense to Others, Harm to Self, and Harmless
Wrongdoing. I also present material from Feinberg’s Social Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall,
1973) and Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980).
34
Feinberg, Offense to Others, 38.
32
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need their spokesmen, in order that our chances of discovering truths and making wise decisions
be increased.”35 What about situations in which a person will be severely offended? Feinberg
does not draw a line there. Rather, he says “no amount of offensiveness in an expressed opinion
can counterbalance the vital social value of allowing unfettered personal expression.”36
The argument for the utility of maximizing liberty for the advancement of knowledge is
based on the epistemic needs of knowledge (non-conformism and creativity), human fallibility,
and the possibility that censorship will suppress views that are either fully true or partially true.
Mill was concerned with maximizing liberty on speech issues for this very reason, and his whole
argument is geared toward that “liberal” end: “If the arguments of the present chapter are of any
validity, there ought to exist the fullest liberty of professing and discussing, as a matter of ethical
conviction, any doctrine, however immoral it may be considered.”37 So far should liberty reach
that if the vast majority believed one thing and only one person believed another, freedom of
speech would be a positive good if for only that one person. Mill says, “If all mankind minus one
were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no
more justified in silencing that one person than he, if he had the power, would be justified in
silencing mankind.”38 We can summarize Mill’s view of the utility of freedom in thought, speech
and expression in this way: humans are intellectually fallible, so limiting freedom of speech risks
silencing a view or part of a view that might be (wholly or partially) true, so all views need to be
expressed and tested to confirm their truth and keep inquiry from becoming stagnant.
On college campuses in particular, this sort of liberty with respect to speech is paramount
from the liberal perspective, as campuses are the primary place in which knowledge is sought

35

Feinberg, Offense to Others, 38.
Feinberg, Offense to Others, 39.
37
Mill, On Liberty, 20n1.
38
Mill, On Liberty, 21.
36
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and dispersed through classes, research, publications, and presentations. As stated by Erwin
Chemerinsky and Howard Gillman, “universities contribute to society when faculty are allowed
to explore the frontiers of knowledge and suggest ways of thinking that may be considered crazy,
distasteful, or offensive to the community.”39 The stakes could not be higher for knowledge, they
say: “When people ask the censor to suppress bad ideas in higher education, many important and
positive ideas never have the chance to flourish, and many dangerous or evil ideas are allowed to
thrive because they are not subjected to evaluation, critique, and rebuttal.”40 Chemerinsky and
Gillman argue that censorship is antithetical to the advancement of knowledge, for “no belief
should be treated as sacrosanct… [and] we must be willing to subject all ideas to the test.”41
Finally, professors who advocate for free speech and also care about their teaching will
argue that the “advancement of knowledge” argument is broader than researchers and professors;
it also includes student knowledge. Institutions of higher education are not only in the business
of educating toward the goal of placing students in jobs, but also teaching them valuable
character traits and dispositions. Chief among them is the virtue of intellectual humility.
Professors are often charged with teaching students to “think critically,” and many view their
position as a vocational mission, not just a job. Many professors wish that their students become
better people, not just more educated, as a result of their classes. And allowing all sorts of
content to be expressed in class, including content that makes students uncomfortable, teaches
the valuable intellectual trait of humility. Dogmatism is the risk when speech is limited: old ideas
can become calcified, and critical, creative thinking is less possible. If censorship of unpopular
ideas is permitted, if some ideas are silenced, the truth may get muted, as Mill worried. It is
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unthinkable to the liberal free speech advocate that this is a contestable proposition: certainly,
s/he argues, none of us is so arrogant as to think that all of our current beliefs or viewpoints are
correct. Only free and unlimited speech subjects all ideas to debate and scrutiny.
Now, in addition to (a) the inherent value of maximizing liberty, which (b) contributes to
the advancement of knowledge, a third case for free speech relates to (c) social progress. The
liberal’s argument here is a simple one: social progress is only possible in an environment in
which everyone is given a chance to voice their opinion on perceived injustices. Free speech is
seen as the condition for the possibility of other freedoms. On college campuses, speech permits
the expression of potential injustices on campus and beyond. This is the argument for free speech
as a first freedom, upon which other freedoms depend. As noted above, speech has a “preferred
position” among the rights enumerated in the U.S. Constitution. As Supreme Court Justice
Benjamin Cardozo opined in Palko vs. Connecticut, “Freedom of expression is the matrix, the
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.”42
The assumption of the “social progress” defense of free speech is that humans are bearers
of dignity, and the argument can be made in both deontological and consequentialist ways. Not
only our self-understanding (i.e., knowledge), but also our self-realization or self-actualization
depends on having freedom of speech. The social progress argument depends on the
advancement of knowledge; once we learn the truth, we would do well to align our lives with it,
the liberal argues. Again, Mill is instructive here. Human individuality, for Mill, is deeply
connected to its dignity. Lest his argument be understood as a kind of Kantian appeal to humans
as “ends in themselves,” Mill mentions that his advocacy for free speech is as a result of his
utilitarian views: “It is proper to state that I forego any advantage which could be derived to my
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argument from the idea of abstract right, as a thing independent of utility.”43 That is to say, his
views on liberty in speech are grounded in his utilitarian ethics because only by permitting
nearly44 all speech are we able to (a) root out incorrect views and continue better ones (the
knowledge point), but also (b) bring our progressive species closer to the greatest good or
happiness for the most people.
Not only is knowledge itself at stake, for the liberal, but also the forward motion of
humanity in the world. We are a progressive species, argues Mill. For although humankind can
create great works of art, more than those “the first in importance surely is man himself.”45 For
Mill, “Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work
prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to
the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing.”46 That is to say, progress of our
species depends on permitting society and its members to test out ideas, with the better ones
extending like branches of a tree. Pettit puts the point differently, but his comments on speech
can be taken as a defense of seeing speech as a basic right. Pettit said as recently as March 2017
that speech is one of the “upstream” liberties upon which downstream liberties depend: rather
than merely being “unhindered,” speech ought to be “protected (and, as we may assume,
consequently unhindered).”47
When examples are given to defend the liberal perspective on speech, they usually
involve the advancement of knowledge and social progress made possible by liberal speech
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codes. Here I will give only two, selected because they blend these two instrumental reasons for
permitting all sorts of speech on college campuses: these two cases, both involving race, are
thought to advance knowledge and promote social progress simultaneously.
First, in March of 2017, hundreds of Middlebury College students confronted an author
who had been invited to speak on campus.48 Charles Murray, along with Richard Herrnstein, coauthored The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life49 in the 1990s,
which argued among other things that inherent racial differences explain some of the disparities
in educational and vocational success. This thesis is seen as an affront to those of us who
maintain strong notions of racial equality, but liberals argue that without freedom of speech,
Herrnstein’s and Murray’s conclusions may have gained traction and converted those who were
on the fence about its claims. Some commentators have noted that “it would have been tempting
to prevent such an idea from being expressed at all.”50 The Bell Curve received considerable
negative feedback. The authors were charged with racism: “Many critics found deeply offensive
the idea that blacks in America were overall less successful than whites not because of persistent
discrimination, but because they were less intelligent.”51
Herrnstein’s and Murray’s arguments, which were evaluated subsequently by a host of
faculty members and academic organizations housed at a number of schools – e.g., Stephen Jay
Gould52 and the American Psychological Association53 – were found to be severely lacking in
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merit. In this case, liberals argue that potentially racist ideas could have exercised greater
influence had they not been discredited by subsequent scholarship. Free speech was vindicated,
they say, as it made the advancement of knowledge and social progress possible in this case.
Conversely, in a different situation, someone may have attempted to refute a truthful idea, but the
critique of the original idea may have failed. In either situation, the advancement of knowledge
and social progress depend on maximizing liberty by having a free and open marketplace of
ideas on college campuses.54
A similar second example is given in Stephen Carter’s Reflections of an Affirmative
Action Baby,55 in which Carter describes an event held by his undergraduate alma mater.
Stanford University decided to give a platform to physicist and Nobel Laureate, William
Shockley, who for reasons unknown to Carter and others, left his primary academic field and
began publishing and speaking about the genetic basis of racial inequality, ideas that many on
Stanford’s campus considered “dangerous.” Like Herrnstein and Murray, Shockley’s main thesis
was that “white people on average score higher on intelligence tests because, on average, they
are more intelligent, and they are more intelligent because they are born that way.”56 Conversely,
“the mean intelligence of black people is significantly below that of white people,” and “this
result is so heavily influenced by genetic inheritance that it is folly to imagine that environmental
factors can do much to change it.”57 Shockley’s subsequent thought-experiment-turned-policyproposal asked people to consider whether human progress or evolution demands that the
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government provide financial stipends to less intelligent people to convince them to not
reproduce.
Carter and his fellow students sat in the audience before the event, a debate between
Shockley and two others, nervous that the claims might be irrefutable. One of the debaters, a
“rabble-rousing psychologist who happened to be black,” was unable to refute Shockley’s
claims, which left many in the audience, Carter included, dismayed. The other debater, “a worldrenowned geneticist who happened to be white… in his turn made mincemeat of Shockley’s
arguments – such utter mincemeat,” Carter notes, “that I began to wonder what all the talk of
dangerousness was about.”58 This was a moment of clarity for Carter, who later reflects on the
event:
“The point is not that Shockley’s arguments were correct – they were nonsense – but
rather that the decision to dismiss them, if indeed they were to be dismissed, should have
been made on the ground of scientific error, not on the ground of racist effect. Put
otherwise, the mere fact that his theories were unattractive should have had no bearing on
whether they were accepted as true.”59
The liberal points out that only through reasoned debate – made possible through free and
unlimited speech – were students able to see the untruth of the points of view being advocated.
The socially conscious liberal takes a victory lap in situations like these: Middlebury and
Stanford students, faculty, and other attendees learn that there are good reasons for rejecting
racist views (social progress) but they were also equipped with the requisite scientific data and
arguments to illustrate the nonsense of such views (advancement of knowledge). I shall have
more to say about these sorts of arguments below, but the point here is that they are offered by
free speech proponents as evidence of the value of free speech for knowledge and progress.
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STANDARD PROBLEM CASES FOR FREE SPEECH
There are many potential responses to the arguments from liberty, knowledge, and
progress that deserve exploration. Three will be explored in this section, each of which
problematizes the liberal perspective by raising a counterexample thought to override the value
of knowledge or progress in favor of speech codes. These arguments claim that speech can and
should be limited in situations where (a) there is no epistemic value to the speech being uttered,
(b) institutional integrity is at stake, or (c) the victim is unable to escape the perpetrator’s insults.
I will address each in what follows.
First, some argue that racial insults and epithets have no epistemic value whatsoever.
Otherwise expressed, insofar as the argument for the free speech depends on the advancement of
knowledge, which itself depends on a broad-reaching understanding of how knowledge works, a
potential criticism of this point could be raised here regarding the utility for knowledge of racial
epithets and insults, i.e., hate speech. Critics of free speech on campus have argued that yelling
the “n-word” at a person of color has only negative consequences, no positive ones that
contribute to knowledge.
Liberals who value free speech would offer a shaky, qualified response. While certainly
less obviously applicable to the advancement of knowledge than, say, scientific studies of a
controversial nature, even hostile outbursts or racial slurs can be fodder for academic and/or
scholarly inquiry. There are at least some relevant and timely observations that can be made in
expressions of racial hatred, free speech proponents would argue. For example, if an informed
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viewer has requisite knowledge of the person doing the yelling or insulting, one can ascertain
important connections about the impetus for hate itself: where it comes from, how it is
expressed, what it reveals about human nature, and how psychological coping mechanisms
against a changing world are manifested in real-life situations. If a witness or victim has a chance
to follow the hate-speech with a question, thereby giving the hate-speaker the opportunity to put
into argument his/her hate, s/he can learn about a distinct political or ideological perspective s/he
did not have access to before the hate was spoken. The liberal argues a broader pedagogical point
here: any instance, any situation, any phrase, any spoken word, is an opportunity for the
advancement of knowledge. Every situation is a teachable moment, “teachable” referring not to
the content of the hate speech but rather the contexts that give rise to hate.
What is more, if racial slurs are met not with further anger and violence but with
confidence and a desire to understand, some liberals believe this may go much further in
changing the minds that had been distorted into believing false ideas about other races. Here the
liberal points to the success of non-violent protests of the 1950s and 1960s in the United States,
or India’s struggle for self-rule in the early twentieth century, as examples of the power of
treating hostile “others” as bearers of dignity who can be responded to with respect. The
contemporary “restorative justice” movement uses these same principles to put perpetrators and
victims into conversation with one another, which has had some transformative effects when
used in school settings.60
Second, critics of absolutist libertarian perspectives on speech argue that speech should
be limited in situations where the permitting free speech could lead to the dismantling of the very
institution in which the speech occurs. I will refer to this as the “existential threat” argument. The
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U.S. courts have broadly upheld speech restrictions in times when voices of dissent were
sufficient to threaten the very institution that the leaders were in charge of protecting. In times of
war, for example, United States politicians have limited the liberty of citizens for fear of
undermining the existence of the country, including limiting what people can say.
These measures were taken as early as the founding of the Republic and continued until
the latter half of the twentieth century. Leaders attempted to deal with a major threat to the new
Union in the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts (1798), which President John Adams signed
into law. During World War I, the Espionage Act of 1917 limited dissent from those opposing
the draft, which birthed a 1919 response written by Oliver Wendall Holmes, who argued that
there are times when free speech can present a “clear and present danger”61 to national security
and public safety. And during World War II, the Chaplinsky vs. New Hampshire case established
the “fighting words” framework: the defendant was charged with violating statutes that
prohibited “any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any
street or other public place.” It was considered “a breach of the peace by provoking the person
addressed to acts of violence.” The courts ruled that Chaplinsky’s “damned Fascist” and
“damned racketeer” language was not protected speech, and limiting his speech in those ways
did “not substantially or unreasonably impinge upon freedom of speech.” The court believed that
these are “epithets likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach
of the peace.”62
As it relates to the topic of free speech on campus, the existential threat argument urges
colleges to prevent guest speakers or forms of speech that would cause such damage or violence
61
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that the event threatens the very institution itself. Presumably, this is what schools like the
University of California at Berkeley have in mind when they refuse speakers like Milo
Yiannopoulos63 and Ann Coulter.64
When viewed through the broader lens of U.S. History, however, proponents of free
speech argue that limiting speech for reasons of existential threat is problematic, as it risks more
than it benefits. For example, while some biographers of Adams (e.g., Page Smith) minimize
Adams’s involvement in the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts or defend the acts as a
necessary sacrifice of liberty in the context of a new republic,65 other historians question this sort
of liberty limitation. John Ferling, for example, argues that “the acts were undertaken largely
toward the goal of maintaining Federalist hegemony.”66 He continues: “The measures sought to
stifle domestic oppression to a war movement that many Federalists perceived as essential for the
Party’s salvation” and Adams “must share complicity in the creation of the measures… by
questioning the conduct of alien residents and by repeatedly warning of Republican treachery
and foreign-inspired cabals.”67 In a letter to Thomas Jefferson, who was adamantly opposed to
limiting liberties, Adams himself expressed regret of his part in the Alien and Sedition acts.68
In modern U.S. history, liberty on speech issues has been expanding, not contracting, and
free speech proponents argue that we would do well not to lose the progress we’ve made by now
outlawing certain words or expressions on college campuses. After the “Free Speech Movement”
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at Berkeley, for example, the court took a novel interpretation of the Constitution in Cohen vs.
California. The state objected to a jacket worn in the Los Angeles County courthouse, upon
which were written the words, “F**k the Draft.” In this case, the court did not say that Cohen’s
objection to the Vietnam war was unprotected in the name of national security; Cohen’s
speech/expression was seen by the courts as deserving of First Amendment protections. The
court’s opinion was quite clear about this: “Surely the State has no right to cleanse public debate
to the point where it is grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us… One man’s
vulgarity is another’s lyric.”69 Three decades later, during the George W. Bush presidency,
objections to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars were rampant, yet they were all permitted as free
speech. These sorts of objections to and protests of public policy are necessary, even vital,
according to the free speech proponent, for liberal democracies in which maximizing liberty and
diversity of opinion contributes to social progress.
On university campuses, too, free speech proponents say the existential threat argument
risks more than it benefits. Many of the universities and colleges that host guest speakers with
controversial views are time-tested, multi-generational institutions that cannot be upended by the
speech of a few individuals. These institutions have excelled to become great institutions
precisely because of their historical commitment to liberty, because they have permitted all sorts
of speech for reasons mentioned above (advancement of knowledge and social progress). That is
to say, liberals note how ironic it is that the former home to the “free speech” movement of the
1960s – UC Berkeley – has become a bastion for censorship of unpopular speakers and ideas.
Liberals think promoters of strict speech codes on college and university campuses are simply
forgetting their history. Would-be censors also ignore the advances made through speech and
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that speech is a first freedom on which other freedoms depend. As Chemerinsky and Gillman put
it:
“Each generation brings new calls to suppress speech, for reasons that appear noble at the
time. Today it is to help create inclusive learning environments for students, and also to
stop speech that might help terrorists. Not long ago, it was to stop pornography on the
ground that it was discrimination against women. From the 1920s until the 1960s, it was
to stop communism. During World War I, it was to preserve the draft and win the war.
The specific issues vary, but the underlying question is always the same: when to stop
speech that is perceived as harmful. One of the key lessons is that almost always, on
reflection, society concludes these efforts were misguided.”70
From the perspective of the free speech proponent, limiting speech on the basis of fear that an
institution will face an existential threat is problematic both on a national level and on college
campuses today. Limiting speech has historically propped up those who were already in power
and silenced voices of dissent, which is to say that limiting speech has the potential to hurt those
who need free speech most. And it undermines the very value that it is intended to protect,
namely, liberty.
Third, some object to free speech and instead argue for speech codes or speech
restrictions on college campuses when victims cannot escape the situation. Unlike the arguments
mentioned above – the non-scientific nature of racial epithets and the existential threat argument
– liberals like Feinberg are sympathetic to this concern, and his present-day intellectual heirs
believe it should be incorporated into speech codes on university campuses. To be sure, in the
majority of cases, Feinberg agrees with Mill that a government should only intervene in private
matters to prevent “harm to others,” and Feinberg believes that he represents Mill’s liberalism in
today’s unique context.71 Feinberg believes liberty is a necessary component of any democratic
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state,72 which leads to his rejection of legal paternalism and legal moralism as sufficient
principles on which to ground the limitation of liberty.73
But offense to others is a different matter for Feinberg, as it is on college campuses. Wise
judgment on speech matters requires getting into the weeds to sort out what types of expression
can justifiably be limited. He discusses a number of cases in which someone has claimed to be
the victim of “profound offense.”74 These situations (a) are deeper and more serious in tone or
shattering, (b) may offend even if the offended party is not there to witness the action/speech, (c)
exist on a deeper level than sensory nuisances and, in some sense, express evil, (d) express evil
and is, therefore, offensive, not vice versa, or (e) can be offensive even when they are not
personal, meaning that the offense is not directed at a specific person.75 Feinberg gives several
examples of profound offense, but the one that relates most directly to the subject of this essay is
this: “Profound offense is never more worthy of respect than when it results from brandishing the
symbols of race hatred and genocide.”76
However, Feinberg suggests that not all these demand speech restrictions. Everything
hinges on the voluntariness of the parties involved, what Feinberg calls “the Volenti standard.”77
He shows this by offering some “balancing tests” to evaluate the situation, which measure the
value of a speech act against the potential harm that speech act might do.78 One of these tests has
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to do with the offensive action/expression itself and how intense the experience was. As an
example, Feinberg quotes William Prosser’s Handbook of the Law of Torts to show that minor
annoyances are not justifiable reasons to limit someone’s liberty, but constant or unrelenting
ones may be: “The seriousness of the inconvenience depends on the extent, duration, and
character of the interference.”79 Another test involves the ability of the offended man or woman
to extricate him/herself from the situation: this is where a mere nuisance offense becomes a
wrongful offense. If a person is easily able to remove her/himself from the situation and,
therefore, not be offended, Feinberg suggests that the limitation of liberty is not warranted.
Feinberg wrote earlier in Social Philosophy that “No one has a right to protection from the state
against offensive experiences if he can effectively avoid those experiences with no unreasonable
effort or inconvenience,”80 a view he reiterates later in Offense to Others.81 One final test that
Feinberg offers relates to the prior knowledge of a would-be victim of hate speech. Feinberg says
it is morally and legally relevant if the offended party knew that s/he may be offended and still
participated in the activity in which s/he was offended. The “Volenti standard” states that the
victim’s “offended states… were voluntarily incurred, or the risk of which was voluntarily
assumed by the person who experienced them,” and, therefore, they ought “not to count as
‘offenses’ at all in the application of a legislative ‘offence principle.’”82
One of Feinberg’s examples illustrates the kinds of offense he believes are not justifiably
limited: writings or images that offend the sensibilities of others, as in the case of graphic or
obscene literature. “When an ‘obscene’ book sits on a shelf,” Feinberg says, “who is there to be
contextual considerations about which localities are more hospitable to potentially offensive expressions
and which are less so, and (d) whether the expression was motivated by malice or spite. See Feinberg,
Offense to Others, 44.
79
Feinberg, Offense to Others, 7.
80
Feinberg, Social Philosophy, 44.
81
Feinberg, Offense to Others, 32: “… no one has a right to protection from the state against offensive experiences
if he can easily and effectively avoid them without unreasonable or inconvenience.”
82
Feinberg, Offense to Others, 35.

32

offended? Those who want to read it for the sake of erotic stimulation presumably will not be
offended (or else they wouldn’t read it), and those who choose not to read it will have no
experience by which to be offended.”83 Having “bare knowledge” of a reality that, if one were
directly exposed to it would seriously offend, but having no direct access to it or not being forced
to engage in it is not sufficient for the limitation of liberty. In fact, becoming offended at the
mere existence of some material reveals more about the offended party than it does about the
limits of liberty. Feinberg writes “if ‘bare knowledge’ that discreet and harmless ‘immoralities’
are occurring in private leads to severe mental distress, we should attribute the distress to
abnormal susceptibilities rather than to the precipitating cause.”84 If the offence principle were
applied to cases of “bare knowledge,” this is more appropriately a case of “legal moralism,”
since there is an impersonal aspect to bare offense cases. In legal moralism, the mere fact that a
person is acting immorally is seen as justification for the limitation of his/her liberty. “The
offense-causing action must be more than wrong,” says Feinberg, “it must be a wrong to the
offended party, in short a violation of his rights.” He continues: “If his impersonal moral outrage
is to be the ground for legal coercion and punishment of the offending party, it must be by virtue
of the principle of legal moralism to which the liberal is adamantly opposed.”85
The liberal argues that rather than having “bare knowledge” of offensive material, an
individual must be a victim of unintended and inescapable exposure to profoundly offensive
speech to justify institutional intervention. S/he must be unable to extricate herself from the
situation. The issue at stake here is the victim’s liberty. And in the name of liberty, she should
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not be required to listen to someone whose ideas are profoundly offensive. This is the only way
to do justice by both the speaker and listener in controversial speech situations.
From the perspective of the free speech proponent, the Volenti standard has some
important implications for today’s campus free speech debates. Instead of the Volenti standard
being a rule about the content of speech, this is a rule about the contexts in which it may be
presented. In contexts where hearers are unable to remove themselves from offensive situations
with a reasonable degree of effort, the speaker should be mindful of his/her audience and make
sure everyone is voluntarily there. In situations where a listener is not free to leave, the university
administration and security should impose content restrictions on speech until the potentially
offended parties are able to remove themselves. However, in situations where everyone is
voluntarily present, the liberal argues that there should be no restrictions on the content of the
speech.
What is more, the free speech proponent points out that the liberty argument cuts both
ways. No one compels guest speakers to only advance socially acceptable ideas, and similarly,
no one compels would-be protesters to participate or show up. Just as a guest speaker is free to
present any idea in a free-speech environment and agreed upon context, so too is the potentially
offended party free to not attend, not get involved, not engage the speaker. The state’s and
university administration’s involvement are dependent on an individual’s ability to voluntarily
withdraw from the situation. Importantly, contemporary proponents of free speech argue that this
is not the case with most of the free speech debates on college campuses happening today; it is
not the case that students are being forced to listen or watch a speaker of hate. Rather, most often
nowadays, students are voluntarily exposing themselves to the hateful ideologies of guest
speakers on campuses in order that they might protest.
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Another consequence of the Volenti standard is that those who pose the most serious risk
– i.e., those who break the rules – should be punished by university administrators and/or local
officers. This, of course, brings us to the “incitement to violence” criterion, which is often cited
as a justifiable reason for the limitation of speech. Although Mill authorized only the “harm to
others” principle and a near absolute liberty with respect to speech, he also suggested that there
are cases in which incitement of a mob to violence is justifiably the purview of the state (to
which we add, the university administration). Here, Mill’s “corn dealer” scenario is relevant.
Mere offense becomes harmful, in Mill’s view, when “delivered orally to an excited mob
assembled” in front of the house of a person toward whom they are hostile (e.g., corn dealers).86
One is free to disagree with a corn-dealer’s business practices, even to circulate or publish “that
corn dealers are starvers of the poor,” but one cannot and must not be permitted to distribute the
material to those on the precipice of violent action: “The liberty of the individual [in this
situation] must be thus far limited; he must not make himself a nuisance to other people.”87 Harm
to the corn-dealer’s business in the form of lost money or clients is insufficient to limit speech,
but harm to his person or his family is sufficient to warrant “the active interference of
mankind.”88 Publishing critiques is legitimate whereas inciting violence is illegitimate harm
insofar as it violates the rights of the corn dealer, in Mill’s view. Using Feinberg’s terminology,
the offense principle becomes an “wrongful offense” when physical injury is likely (which puts it
under the umbrella of the harm principle).
Today’s free speech advocates argue that the prohibition of offensive speakers from
presenting their ideas on campus due to security concerns reveals much: it speaks not to the
value of those ideas, but rather the character of their students and protesters who will show up to
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controversial events. Bearing in mind the Volenti standard, the liberal argues that an angry or
hateful (though peaceful) rhetorician does not pose a greater threat than students who cannot be
trusted to respond rationally to ideas with which they disagree. Free speech proponents point to
recent examples of violence from students and activists on college campuses: punching peaceful
protesters, throwing smoke bombs, setting fires, knocking down barriers, etc.89 The liberal, in
short, says the person who actually commits a violent act is a greater threat to security than the
person who merely expresses a bigoted opinion verbally. Punishing or silencing those who speak
pulls us away from the real threats to security, the liberal argues.
The free speech proponent, having liberty as his/her fundamental value, applies the
Volenti standard widely in society: no one is forced to read Facebook posts, Twitter tweets,
Instagram updates, Snapchat messages, or view television. If a viewer becomes offended, s/he
has the freedom to turn it off. The ability to voluntarily remove oneself from the offensive
situation is what separates the “harm principle,” the subject of Feinberg’s first of four volumes in
the Moral Limits series, from the “offense principle,” the subject of his second. Offense only
becomes harmful when a person is unable to avoid the offender. As stated in the often-cited case
of hate speech involving the Village of Skokie vs. National Socialist Party of America,90 the
Illinois Supreme Court said that “A speaker who gives prior notice of his message has not
compelled a confrontation with those who voluntarily listen… [We] direct the citizens of Skokie
that it is their burden to avoid the offensive [swastika] symbol if they can do so without
reasonable inconvenience.”91
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Those of us who followed the Charlottesville incident and its fallout can see that this is
what Tina Fey had in mind in Saturday Night Live’s “Weekend Update: Summer Edition” of
2017. A University of Virginia graduate, Fey said,
“I know a lot of us are feeling anxious and are asking ourselves, ‘What can I do? I would
urge people, instead of participating in the screaming matches and potential violence…
Don’t yell at the Klan. I want to encourage all sane Americans to treat these rallies like
the opening of a thoughtful movie with two female leads: don’t show up! Let these
morons scream into the empty air.”92
With respect to the content of speech, the liberal pushes proponents of restrictive speech codes to
accept that even someone as detestable as a white supremacist should be afforded an opportunity
to speak. For while most of his opinions are reprehensible, racist views are not the totality of
what he argues. Since his is a minority position, at least some of his argument must also be for
his right to speak. And when he argues for his right to speak, he is arguing for everyone’s right to
speak, a point on which he agrees with those who defend liberal democracies.
For Mill and Feinberg, it is likely that most opinions contain some amount of truth and
some amount of falsehood, but free speech permits those statements of truth to be revealed. What
at first seems like a river of opinions frighteningly gushing downstream will lead to “the deposit
which was left behind them when the flood subsided.”93 In today’s context, even a left-leaning
proponent of liberty accepts the one kernel of truth white supremacists have that is worth
listening to: their petition for freedom of speech. If we silence them, free speech proponents
argue, we silence free speech in two senses: in both their immediate content and context (e.g.,
not giving them a platform), and in the broader sense of silencing their arguments about free
speech, which should be heard.
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Thus far, the liberal case for free speech argued that regardless of how offensive or
seemingly hurtful, the freedom to speak any point of view is necessary for the advancement of
knowledge and for the progress of society. And whereas the Volenti standard exists to increase
liberty – namely, freedom of movement – the existential threat argument was problematic, as it
undermined fundamental liberties and has historically been regretted by those who imposed
restrictions on speech. Unlike some other freedoms (e.g., guns94), free speech proponents see it
as a first freedom that has a “preferred position” of vital public interest, a moral and political
prerequisite for the expression that one has other fundamental interests. In the liberal’s view,
knowledge and social progress depend on it.
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THE CASE FOR SPEECH RESTRICTIONS ON CAMPUS
As racially-charged speech is given more expansive legal protections, so too do the
charges of speech’s misuse increase, and there are those who argue for censorship of hostile
words and phrases. In this section, we will hear their arguments. I will first explore the reasons
for regulating speech on college campuses – psychological and potentially physical effects of
hate speech on college students – and responses by specific schools to address these challenges.
Second, I will discuss the solution advocated by some critical race theorists, in particular,
Charles Lawrence, who suggests that racist speech should be seen as “fighting words.” Third, we
will hear from thinkers who express great hostility toward the very idea of a “war on free
speech,” those who are challenging the narrative surrounding speech in today’s debates but
nonetheless argue for speech restrictions of some sort (Stanley Fish, Anthony Leaker, and Philip
Pettit).
Critics of liberal speech codes give many reasons for wanting to limit offensive speech on
campus, and they all hinge on a tacit assumption regarding the social purpose of a university: to
protect its students. The argument runs as follows: we don’t want students to be marginalized by
exposure to material that may cultivate in them the feeling that they are not full members of our
community. Those about whom the offensive comments are made (or on whose backs they fall)
have dignity and deserve respect by virtue of their personhood; they should be spoken about
accordingly. On this much, there is overlap between conversations about offensive speech and
discussions of hate speech.
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According to advocates for restrictive speech codes, hate speech has real – mental,
emotional, and physical – effects in the lives of its victims. Richard Delgado suggests that hate
speech causes serious psychological harms, which result in fragmentation and polarization based
on (among other things) racial categories: “In addition to the harms of immediate emotional
distress and infringement of dignity, racial insults inflict psychological harm upon the victim.
Racial slurs may cause long-term emotional pain because they draw upon and intensify the
effects of the stigmatization, labeling, and disrespectful treatment that the victim has previously
undergone.”95 Not only are there psychological impacts of hate speech, but also potentially
physical ones. Mari Matsuda says, “Victims of vicious hate propaganda experience
psychological symptoms and emotional distress ranging from fear in the gut to rapid pulse rate
and difficulty in breathing, nightmares, post-traumatic stress syndrome, stress disorder,
hypertension, psychosis, and suicide.”96 These are serious consequences, and insofar as offensive
speech mirrors the effects of hate speech, they demand a response.
The solution to these serious consequences of hate speech is, in the minds of critical race
theorists, censorship of hostile words and phrases. Delgado partnered with Jean Stefancic to
write Critical Race Theory, arguing that the only way to minimize these negative effects is
through legislation, on college campuses and in society more broadly. As they discuss the
potential responses to critical race theory, they argue that “the status quo is inherently racist,
rather than merely sporadically and accidentally so… The need for regulation of hate crime and
speech will probably eventually become evident [in the United States], as it has to dozens of
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European and Commonwealth nations.”97 We stop offensive speech by prohibiting it on campus,
critical race theorists say. After that, we will make progress toward limiting offense felt by
innocent victims. If offensive or hateful speech is harmful, then the college is justified in getting
involved to limit what people can and cannot say. More speech is not the solution; it is the
problem, in response to which “we should deepen suspicion of remedies for deep-seated social
evils that rely on speech and exhortation.”98
Their advice has been followed by many schools,99 manifested in speech codes of various
types. Some schools hold individuals accountable and punish them if their actions provoked in
another student fear or anxiety. Other schools punish students if their speech is religiously,
racially, or otherwise offensive to another student. Universities are dedicated to fostering a rich
and satisfying college experience for students, and words or phrases that offend make the
environment inhospitable to student success.
Another critical race theorist, Charles R. Lawrence III, provides an argument that
illustrates why colleges should adopt these policies.100 In his essay, “If He Hollers Let Him Go:
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Regulating Racist Speech on Campus,” Lawrence provides justification for speech restrictions in
two ways. First, Lawrence argues that First Amendment protections should not apply to racial
insults because “the injury is instantaneous” and “there is neither the opportunity for
intermediary reflection on the idea conveyed nor an opportunity for responsive speech.”101 In
Lawrence’s view, racial epithets do not serve the First Amendment; they subvert it. He writes,
“If the purpose of the first amendment is to foster the greatest amount of speech, then racial
insults disserve that purpose. Assaultive racist speech functions as a preemptive strike.”102
Lawrence echoes Delgado’s comments about the real psychological effects of hate speech on
campuses in what he calls “the visceral, emotional response” that “precludes speech.”103 In
response to such hatred, Lawrence says students who are already disenfranchised are stunned and
unable to think clearly enough to respond. Further, he argues that nothing can solve the problem:
“When one is personally attacked with words that denote one’s subhuman status and
untouchability, there is little (if anything) that can be said to redress either the emotional or
reputational injury.”104 The voluntariness criterion in liberal speech codes is a fiction: hostile
words and phrases strike an initial, irreparable blow.
Second, Lawrence argues for limiting speech by equating racist remarks with “fighting
words.” Since victims of racist speech are flummoxed and powerless in response, he believes
there is a “functional equivalent” between hate speech and fighting words. What difference is
there, Lawrence could ask, between yelling “damned Racketeer” at someone, which was not
protected speech, and yelling the “n-word” at a vulnerable student? To be sure, Lawrence says
“the fighting words doctrine is a paradigm based on a white male point of view,” and “the
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fighting words doctrine presupposes an encounter between two persons of relatively equal power
who have been acculturated to response to face-to-face insults with violence.”105 But “since
minorities are likely to lose the fight, they are forced to remain silent and submissive.”106 The
best option to address this problem, in Lawrence’s view, is not only to “deny the truth of the
word’s application,” but also to “deny the truth of the word’s meaning.”107 And at the time when
Lawrence is writing, the early 1990s, it is “a meaning shouted from the rooftops by the rest of the
world a million times a day.”108 In other words, universities should adopt policies meant to
contribute to student flourishing, which means prohibiting certain words or phrases.
Socially-conscious free speech proponents view Lawrence’s intentions as noble, but they
take issue with several aspects of his argument. Most disconcerting to them is that Lawrence is
sending the wrong message to and about minority groups in general and African Americans in
particular. What message does it send to a young black student to be told that s/he does not
possess the wherewithal to countenance insulting language and respond rationally with
confidence using the facts of racial equality? Conservative commentator and former State
Department official, Alan Keyes, expresses an indignant response: “To think that I [as a black
person] will… be told that white folks have the moral character to shrug off insults, and I do
not… That is the most insidious, the most insulting, the most racist statement of all!”109
Reflecting on Keyes’s statement, Stephen Carter expresses the same preference: “My sympathies
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generally run toward freedom, and I would oppose efforts to regulate racism that is reflected in
simple speech, even when the racist views are insulting, offensive, or painful.”110
Even from the point of view of some African American academics, Lawrence’s position
is overly extreme: when Lawrence argues for prohibiting racial epithets in any context, he
departs from other, more moderate critical race theorists like Mari Matsuda. While describing
some of the emotional and physical pain associated with hate speech on campus, Matsuda
suggests that we should not censor those who make such claims under the banner of academic
inquiry and scientific discovery, a claim that Carter praises.111 Free speech proponents say that
we should permit various content to be spoken, including the use of speech to counter incorrect
or hateful speech. Rather than giving students tools to overcome hatred, African American free
speech proponents suggest that Lawrence’s assessment of the situation further disempowers
young minority students.
But Lawrence and other critical race theorists have a ready-made retort. As noted above,
critical race theorists argue that making a content/context distinction already betrays a racist bias:
the context of the distinction itself is inherently racist. Racial imbalance, they argue, is already
woven into a system that claims to be viewpoint-neutral. And so, no matter what response a
liberal will offer, the free speech proponent cannot escape the fundamental assumption made by
critical race theorists. Daria Roithmayr writes that scholars who work in critical race theory,
“share two very broad commitments. First, as a critical intervention into traditional civil
rights scholarship, critical race theory describes the relationship between ostensibly raceneutral ideals, like ‘the rule of law,’ ‘merit,’ and ‘equal protection,’ and the structure of
white supremacy and racism. Second, as a race-conscious and quasi-modernist
intervention into critical legal scholarship, critical race theory proposes ways to use ‘the
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vexed bond between law and racial power’… to transform that social structure and to
advance the political commitment of racial emancipation.”112
That is to say, critical race theory departs from liberalism, even the liberalism of the civil rights
movement, by opining that racism is built into the system. There is no “neutral space” in which
to pursue a reasoned discussion. “To think that access to higher education is neutral and
apolitical is to be hoodwinked by the myth of meritocracy,” argues Margaret Zamudio, as “It
rests on an uncritical acceptance of the master narrative that asserts our educational (and other)
institutions have banished racism and bias after the passage of civil rights legislation in the 1950s
and 60s.”113
Nor are critical race theorists satisfied by the liberal’s “equality before the law”
argument. Against those who see the Constitution as color blind, Neil Gotanda says that this
notion is absurdly “self-contradictory.”114 If leaders in a political system vow not to recognize
race in their administration of justice, they paint themselves into a philosophical corner: “For
nonrecognition to make sense, it must be possible to recognize something while not including it
in making a decision,”115 a proposition Gotanda finds self-refuting.
When arguments for equality under the law were advanced in the early Civil Rights
movement, progress did not follow at the speed with which many hoped it would. That is to say,
people of color tried to be heard and competitive in the “color blind” world of early civil rights
activists, playing by the same rules as their oppressors, accepting the table as it had been set for
them. When they still did not believe their voices were heard, they wrote new rules and played a

112

Daria Roithmayr, “Introduction to Critical Race Theory in Educational Research and Praxis,” in Race Is… Race
Isn’t: Critical Race Theory and Qualitative Studies in Education (L. Parker, D. Deyhle, and S. Villenas,
eds.; New York: Westview Press, 1999), 1.
113
Margaret Zamudio, et al, Critical Race Theory Matters: Education and Ideology (New York: Routledge, 2011),
64.
114
Neil Gotanda, “A Critique of ‘Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” in Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge (2d.
ed.; Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000), 35.
115
Gotanda, “A Critique,” in Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge, 35.

45

different game. “Critical race theory scholars demonstrated that concepts that the reformists had
taken for granted as helpful – color blindness, formal legal equality, merit, integration – in fact
reflected, created, and perpetuated institutional racial power.”116 Early critical race “scholars
pointed out,” for example, “that the color-blind perspective represses and renders irrelevant the
ways in which race shapes social relationships.”117 Additionally, they also “explained how
formal legal equality in fact adopts the perspective of the perpetrator by requiring evidence of
conscious racial animus in a discrete discriminatory act, and by ignoring those instances in which
racism is built into the structure of social institutions.”118
Put simply, critical race theorists do not accept the fundamental assumptions that guide
the liberal’s point of view: that in an environment of free speech, the best arguments will win out
and the truth will overcome. They argue against the system they view as indelibly racist. Critical
race theorists play by different rules and begin with different presuppositions.
In addition to critical race theorists, a second group favoring restrictions on speech argue
that there is no “war on free speech,” as conservative pundits assert. They question the “cultural
narrative” surrounding speech while, simultaneously, arguing for various forms of speech
restrictions. That is to say, these “cultural narrative” critiques take issue with the ways in which
speech is talked about today. Stanley Fish, for example, titled an essay and the book in which it
is located, “There’s No Such Thing as Free Speech, and It’s a Good Thing, Too.”119 Fish and
others (e.g., Haworth,120 or Horton and Alexander121) argue that free speech does not have
inherent value, only instrumental value, and it should be held alongside competing values and
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judged in light of the potential sacrifices of those other values. While Fish does not direct his
remarks at the college or university environment per se, his comments are nonetheless relevant
to understanding why those on campuses might want to limit the speech that takes place on those
campuses. If speech were absolutely unlimited, all of the arguments about the good of free
speech could get drowned out by yelling voices. Some governance of speech or rules of conduct
that limit speech are necessary to preserve order while various viewpoints are being presented.
However, the liberal would respond, again, that there is a difference between the content
of speech and the contexts in which speech is expressed (contra critical race theorists). And
insofar as Fish is arguing against an unrestricted context, the liberal position is in full agreement:
speech has never been and never should be truly unlimited in context. Proponents of free speech
accept that we need rules to govern how we speak to each other so as to increase everyone’s
ability to speak. But Fish recognizes neither the expanding protections for speech nor how that
expansion has benefited minority groups who have used speech to better their situation.
Fish goes further, however, to say that the concept of free speech has been hijacked by
zealots who are merely advancing their own agendas. The concept of “free speech” itself, does
“not have any ‘natural’ content but [is] filled with whatever content and direction one can
manage to put into [it].”122 The concept is just a title, a name, a placeholder that allows us to
“serve the substantive agendas we wish to advance.”123 It’s not an independent American ideal as
much as it is “a political prize, and if that prize has been captured by a politics opposed to
yours,” Fish states, “it can no longer be invoked in ways that further your purposes.”124 When
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free speech becomes a political prize, it loses its original value and strays from the intention of
the First Amendment, “for it is now an obstacle to those purposes.”125
Fish’s argument against free speech in today’s context is similar to the “cultural
narrative” argument offered by Anthony Leaker in his forthcoming book, Against Free
Speech.126 Leaker laments that free speech is a “Trojan horse” for unverified, unscientific,
hateful ideology, “part of an onslaught against a range of oppressed minorities and progressive
gains of the last half century.”127 The idea that there is a crisis with free speech is, for Leaker, “a
self-serving myth manufactured… by racist opportunists.”128 Leaker believes their real
agenda/goals are to preserve their “dominant worldview” which “normalizes and universalizes
the values of their gender, race, and class.”129 Leaker’s assessment of the current situation is
harsh, and his attribution of motives on those who defend free speech is uncompromising. For
example, he charges free speech advocates of hypocrisy; they “decry censorship while denying
their critics a voice.”130
Leaker disagrees with free speech proponents who marshal Mill in defense of their
positions by pointing out that the situations Mill addressed and the situations current advocates
of free speech address are drastically different: (a) Mill, he argues, attacked social arrangements
and viewed speech as contributing to that end while free speech advocates today seek to preserve
social arrangements; (b) Mill valued diversity while today’s “free speechers” want homogeneity;
(c) Mill despised custom as a roadblock to progress, while today’s free speech advocates only
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desire to protect old, “calcified points of view”; and (d) “above all, Mill recognized the
importance of questioning the framing of a debate or the conditions of possibility of argument,”
which Leaker does not see in today’s free speech advocates. In sum, Leaker argues “against free
speech” because it is in conflict with that which we hold dear: equality, tolerance, respect,
inclusion, etc. Today’s free speech defenders, Leaker says, are “far removed from the Millian
ideal of serving the pursuit of truth, progress, and the improvement of mankind.”131
In an interview with the Freedom for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE), a non-profit
and non-partisan advocacy group for free speech on college campuses, Leaker showed how his
views relate to situations universities are facing with hate speech and guest speakers.132 One
theme that emerged from Leaker’s interview is that he does not believe the government should
be responsible for policing language or speech; state-sponsored intervention is not the solution.
Another theme that emerged from this interview is that Leaker thinks the status quo privileges
straight white men, “and the university is no different.” His primary goal is to challenge the
narrative that free speech is under threat in the college or university context. Leaker, like critical
race theorists, argues that free speech may well be a good ideal if all participants were equal
contributors, but the hoped-for “viewpoint neutrality” is a farce because there are great structural
inequalities and power imbalances. Leaker’s perspective is hostile to the idea of free speech, and
his language is practically Nietzschean in its ambitious will to power.
His position is also subject to the most criticism from proponents of free speech on
campus. The liberal can offer several responses to Leaker’s Against Free Speech,
counterarguments that also apply to Fish’s comments on the hijacking of free speech. First,
Leaker makes the argument against free speech within a context that permits his argument to be
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made; that is, he benefits from and is only able to raise his concerns from within the context
provided by liberal speech codes. Leaker believes that speech has been co-opted by racists to
racist ends, but then he co-opts speech to call others racists. The liberal will point out that
Leaker’s paradoxical reliance on the very principle he attacks is prima facia self-refuting. Leaker
admitted as much to the FIRE host, calling the title of his book “self-defeating” and “polemical.”
Second, when pressed by the FIRE representative, Leaker admitted that his real target is
not speech, but rather structural inequality that has economic roots. The liberal will respond,
therefore, that Leaker not devoting his time and attention spilling ink on the real issues he cares
about – racism and economic opportunities – and instead attacking the vehicle those very
disenfranchised people can most use (their self-expression/speech) to make their situation better.
This second liberal response to Leaker says that speech is a scapegoat or smoke-screen, which
betrays his inability to deal with the real problems he would like to address.
Third, liberals will take issue with Leaker’s mechanism of enforcement (or lack thereof).
Leaker does not want the government in charge of enforcing speech codes, and presumably the
same logic by which he arrives at this conclusion would prompt him to not want a university’s
administration or discipline policy to enforce them. Presumably, a small group of governing
authorities cannot be trusted to safeguard individual liberties. However, institutional policies
require enforcement, and Leaker is not clear on whom he is relying to do the enforcement for
which he argues. If it is not the leaders, then it is the masses, which could lead to mob mentality
and the very tyranny of the majority that worried Mill. What if the person or persons charged
with creating and enforcing speech codes on his campus in the U.K. had a different perspective
than he does on which material was offensive and/or hateful? Leaker’s argument provides no
helpful answers to the proponent of free speech.
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Fourth, Leaker presents students as suffering under harsh institutional regimes, yet free
speech proponents suggest that often students have much more power than he believes they do.
Students can petition faculty and administration, they can hold peaceful protests, they can
negatively evaluate their school and professors (these days made more widely available through
the internet), etc. Again, taken to an extreme, student protests can devolve into ferocious mob
rule, which should have been peacefully combatted through free speech, according to the liberal.
Finally, Leaker’s argument is, as stated above, a cultural narrative critique, but free
speech proponents say he undercuts his real goal when he argues against the very tools through
which a disenfranchised person can become enfranchised. When asked about his solutions to the
inequality that he hopes his comments on speech will address, Leaker had none to give. Many of
Leaker’s comments in the FIRE interview would be seen by liberals as striking – that there are
other places for free expression than a university; universities aren’t seeking truth these days; we
don’t need a balanced view about some things; there are some arguments we don’t need to hear
anymore – but he offers no solutions other than to attack the mechanism by which free people
improve their situation. The liberal can praise one part of Leaker’s approach, however, the fact
that his perspective is evolving: Leaker says he is beginning to acknowledge the complexity of
the issue and that his position is evolving with the more he reads about the benefits of free
speech. But as of the time of this writing, he has yet to put his appreciation for the benefits of
free speech in print.
Philip Pettit offers a similar cultural narrative critique of free speech today. Pettit takes
stock of current trends in culture and politics, and finds major changes in the intellectual and
social landscapes that set communications today apart from those of the early 1990s, including
the media college students are ingesting. Pettit says, “I am quite ready to believe that freedom of
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speech in some areas impacts negatively on other equally or more important freedoms,” which
he then proceeds to explain in terms similar to Feinberg’s “harm principle.”133 As recently as
May 2018, Pettit argued in a University of Melbourne lecture134 that we have left the context in
which Enlightenment ideals of freedom of speech were created and refined. These values were
steeled in the fires of despotism, “when the danger was the despotism of a single, dictatorial
voice, religious or political.”135
However, Pettit says the times have changed. We no longer face the threat of a tyrannical
government in the west, but rather we face the chaos – anarchy even – created by an unrestricted
free speech. These previously held values “need rethinking at a time when” we are living in a
“free-for all of many undisciplined voices.”136 He likens our current era to a polluted sky: “Just
as light pollution stops us from seeing the stars, so pollution of the news and science media stops
us from tracking the truth.”137 This problem is more pressing now than ever, says Pettit, because
“it invites us to wallow in our preferred view of the world, signing up to whatever view most
appeals.”138 In contrast to our contemporary plethora of twenty-four hour news and social media,
Pettit says “freedom requires that we should be entitled to our own opinions, as Daniel Moynihan
once said, but not that we be entitled to our own facts.”139 When institutions shift, as he believes
they have in the Trump era, so too must we rethink the Enlightenment ideals we are holding
onto. Pettit says, “the marketplace of ideas will foster truth only in the presence of contestability.
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And contestability presupposes traceable speakers, group norms and a concern with esteem. But
while despotism undermines this, so does the sort of anarchy allowed by the internet.”140
Unlike Leaker, Pettit offers some general and specific solutions. The general solution is
that we engage a “non-despotic gatekeeping institution” of “the economy of esteem.”141 By this,
Pettit means that we should separate areas of persuasion from areas of truth-seeking, and do our
best not to confuse the two. “Let scientific institutions and media,” says Pettit, “be independent
of politics, commerce, and religion.”142 Distinct domains would, presumably, provide
appropriate checks and balances on messaging. And while orthodoxies may emerge, in the
economy of esteem they can be challenged and rethought.
In addition to the general suggestion to keep persuasion and truth-seeking distinct, in a
recent interview Pettit offers a suggestion on the persuasion category, specifically as it relates to
political campaigns.143 In the 2016 US Elections, messages were sent without concern for who
(or “what,” as is the case with “bots”) sent the message, especially through “narrow casting”
towards a specific niche audience on social media platforms. Pettit suggests that advertisers
should be compelled to offer a “signature” in the same way that television advertisements are
required to do so (e.g., “I’m So-and-so, and I approved the content of this advertisement” or
“This ad paid for by So-and-so for America PAC”). In online platforms, Pettit suggests,
advertisers should include a website that links to all of the advertisements they have paid for or
140
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used, a registry of this PAC or candidate’s messaging. If all the messages by a company were
available for viewing by the public or members of the truth-seeking media, we would not find
out “after the fact” that an election was compromised, and voters could have information as close
to “real time” as possible.
Additionally, Pettit offers a suggestion not only about the content of our speech, but also
the manner in which it is conveyed, i.e., the conduct of our expression. Pettit believes the basic
liberties need to be co-satisfiable, and he argues that even though some thorny issues rear their
heads when trying to accomplish this, they can be solved by adopting “rules under which people
are given options that are close to the original, problematic options but are capable of meeting
the constraint of co-satisfaction.”144 He considers a town hall meeting in which various voices
may drown out the others, and in response argues for the deployment of Robert’s Rules, which
“allow people to take turns in speaking, dictating a pattern under which they can each make
proposals, suggest amendments to the proposals of others, and debate and vote on the various
issues that arise in their discussion.”145 According to Pettit, many of the issues we have in the
conducting of public debates can be solved by adopting a standard of rules which everyone
agrees to follow.146
On several points, the free speech proponent is in agreement with Pettit. Insofar as he is
supportive of the concept of freedom as “non-domination,” the liberal is in total agreement with
him. Non-domination is seen as a helpful principle for establishing a set of rules in which speech
may be truly free. Further, free speech is not significantly threatened by more transparency in
online advertising; transparency increases liberty, not hinders it. Finally, Pettit’s suggestion that
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public events unfold according to Robert’s Rules (or some other agreed-upon format) is not
antithetical to the free speech proponent’s point of view, as it will maximize liberty for a greater
diversity of opinions to be shared.
However, proponents of free speech will take issue with some of Pettit’s other ideas.
First, behind Pettit’s attack on specific content – e.g., that people are not entitled to their own
facts – lies a deeper concern that speech restrictions will not fully address or eradicate. The
liberal would suggest that, just like Leaker above, the real target of Pettit’s remarks is not an
abundance of speech. Speech is seen by the liberal as a vehicle through which a darker reality is
brought to light, but speech is not the root issue itself. Pettit’s real, underlying concern is for a
gullible public who cannot tell fact from fiction. The present day “anarchy allowed by the
internet” is not solved by regulating speech online; it is solved, according to free speech
proponents, by teaching internet users to think more critically. Unless private property is
abolished, advertisers and so-called “influencers” will always seek to push people to purchase,
do, believe, say, or support this or that. It is up to teachers, the liberal argues, philosophy
professors like Pettit, to help students sort through it all.147 Further, those who argue for free
speech say it is up to families to teach kids the value of turning entertainment off and thinking
more mindfully about the media they consume (and the products they buy). More concerning
than the content we consume are the almost ravenous habits of our consumption, the liberal
argues.
Second, the liberal will take issue with the fact that Pettit, like Leaker, does not
adequately specify the identity of the censor, or what mechanisms should hold the censor
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accountable. Governmental agencies may require political advertisers to identify themselves, but
who regulates or oversees those governmental agencies? Pettit, like other advocates for
restrictions on free speech, is setting himself and other learned academics up as something of a
new medieval church, the arbiter of truth in what they perceive to be a post-truth age. But the
free speech proponent will argue that the answer to incorrect speech is not less speech, but more,
until a consensus emerges around that which is true. And even then, old ideas should be
continually rethought.
Third and finally, Pettit can be criticized from the liberal’s perspective and critical race
theorists when he fails to recognize the bias inherent in all efforts to communicate. No one is
value-free, there is no “view from nowhere,” and everyone is biased. This is the reality that
critical race theories are intended to address: “the status quo is inherently racist,” they say.
Proponents of free speech argue that this is precisely why we need the content of speech to be
unrestricted. To suggest that there are “truth-seekers” out there is to neglect that truth-seeking
comes in degrees; some will be better at it than others. But silencing the opinions of some at the
expense of others does not lead toward greater truth but rather greater conformity and less
innovative thinking.
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IRRECONCILABLE INCOMPATIBILITIES
Thus far, we have heard from advocates of free speech and advocates of speech
restrictions on college campuses. Proponents of free speech believe maximizing liberty on
speech issues advances knowledge and social progress, but free speech proponents struggle to
find meaningful responses that allay the worries of those who claim there is no epistemic value
of racial epithets; the “every event is a teachable moment” argument seems cruel in events where
a member of a minority group is experiencing that event as harassment. Certainly, gaining some
modicum of knowledge by witnessing and permitting a harmful speech act is not worth the
sacrifice to the victim’s person or mental state. Further, free speech proponents must concede
some restrictions on the contexts in which expressions are uttered, if only for maximizing the
number of speakers, making their “freedom at all costs” approach heavily qualified and
dependent on a content/context distinction that critical race theorists have spilled much ink
contesting. The other side fares no better: proponents of speech restrictions on college campuses
seek to minimize the painful and lasting effects of racial discrimination, but in doing so they
undermine the means through which disenfranchised minorities can improve their situation.
One potential solution to this dilemma is to seek middle ground, draw further
distinctions, and hope both sides can eventually see eye to eye. For example, one could
differentiate the legal and moral questions. Feinberg describes the distinction by saying, “A man
has a legal right when the official recognition of his claim (as valid) is called for by the
governing rules… A man has a moral right when he has a claim the recognition of which is
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called for… by moral principles, or the principles of an enlightened conscience.”148 In an
otherwise neutral plane of argument, the legal and moral questions ought not be conflated: the
legal issue at stake in this essay is one of liberty to speak, but the moral issue concerns the
content of the speech, thereby refining a second distinction already mentioned between the
content of speech and the contexts in which it is expressed. Free speech proponents argue for no
restrictions on the content of speech while recognizing and embracing the fact that there are
some contexts in which certain types of speech should be limited. Colleges and universities are
well within their rights, they argue, to create a set of rules for what types of speech can occur in
which locations, but they also suggest that these rules must apply equally to all members of their
communities, regardless of content. Many free speech proponents repudiate white supremacy
and bigotry by making the context/content distinction. Chemerinsky and Gillman argue that only
by deregulating and extending freedom in the realm of speech can we root out inferior beliefs
and effectively convince others to change their beliefs and actions.
Those proposing middle or moderate positions exploit distinctions like these to find
common ground between the extremes on both sides. Andrew Altman, for example, believes two
things may both be true at the same time: some proponents of free speech are racists,
homophobes, etc. and free speech is also a public good that can serve to discredit those same
people. Altman sees himself as a full member of the “liberal” tradition, and in his article,
“Liberalism and Campus Hate Speech: A Philosophical Examination,”149 Altman seeks a middle
ground between those who argue on the one hand that we should not outlaw any speech and
those who argue for robust censorship in words and phrases. “Like those who favor sweeping
regulation, I accept the claim that hate speech can cause serious psychological harm to those at
148
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whom it is directed,” but “I do not believe that such harm can justify regulation, sweeping or
otherwise” and instead we should regulate only certain kinds of hate speech.150 Rather than
embracing the extremes, “there is a defensible middle ground between those who oppose all
campus hate-speech regulation and those who favor the sweeping regulation of such speech.”151
Altman differentiates between “perlocutionary effects” of speech (the impact on a
listener) and “illocutionary force” of speech (the kind of speech it is, e.g., advising, insulting,
questioning, etc.).152 He suggests that Matsuda and Lawrence are actually arguing against hate
speech because it “can inflict a wrong in virtue of its illocutionary acts, the very speech acts
performed in the utterances of such speech.”153 The problem with Matsuda’s and Lawrence’s
view of regulation, according to Altman, is that it is messy. “I do not believe,” he says, “that a
clean and neat line can be drawn around those forms of hate speech that treat their targets as
moral subordinates.”154 As a liberal, Altman is bound by the principle of “viewpoint-neutrality,”
which can only be overturned in situations where speech (a) does not contribute to public
dialogue, (b) is not within the jurisdiction of governmental authorities to police, and, most
worrisome for Altman, (c) is not likely to result in some extreme regulation (i.e., the slippery
slope argument does not work).155
Notwithstanding the messiness involved, Altman asks the reader to accept that the wrong
of hate speech is not the specific words but rather the moral subordination or one group or
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individual at the hands of another: “Some forms of hate speech do wrong to people by treating
them as moral subordinates,” and “this is the wrong that can and should be the target of campus
hate-speech regulations.”156 That is to say, campus speech regulations should be primarily
concerned with the intent of the speaker, specifically the intent to treat another person as a moral
subordinate, and that the inherent risks of limiting these kinds of speech are not as bad as the
effects of permitting them.
Free speech advocates will appreciate Altman’s effort to craft speech policies from a
position of “viewpoint neutrality,” which the liberal believes is essential in crafting policies that
apply to different kinds of people with different points of view. Further, moderates will
appreciate that Altman posits a middle ground between the extremes in this debate (a point he
reaffirms in his essay, “Speech Codes and Expressive Harm”157). Altman also recognizes the
complexity of the situation, which requires the weighing of some social goods against other
goods, for “it is reasonable to think that general rules against all forms of verbal harassment
would be preferable to a speech code limited to categories such as race and gender.”158 And
when it comes to evaluating a specific instance of speech to determine whether it violated a code,
his standard asks whether “the abusive speech materially interfere with a student’s opportunity to
take advantage of the benefits of campus life? But in the interpretation and application of that
standard, the distinctive expressive power of racist epithets and similar terms of abuse would be
taken into account.”159 Altman tries to craft a policy around the content/context distinction,
which other liberals appreciate. And in some situations, Altman recognizes that speech should
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not be limited at all: “scientific or philosophical discourse” is a very different thing than speech
intended “to express the feelings of the speaker.”160
But as is the case with any moderate/middle position, Altman’s is subject to criticism
from both sides of the debate. In elucidating the divergent assumptions, the debate appears to
become more and more irresolvable. Altman’s attempts at finding middle ground will likely fall
on deaf ears, for both sides are too entrenched. The “all else being equal” nature of his argument
does not represent how advocates of speech restrictions view the situation. The “neutral plane”
of argument simply does not exist, in the view of critical race theorists and those who question
the cultural narrative surrounding speech, and the former left critical liberalism and traditional
civil rights approaches for this very reason: “Unlike traditional civil rights, which embraces
incrementalism and step-by-step progress,” Delgado and Stefancic argue, “critical race theory
questions the very foundations of the liberal order, including equality theory, legal reasoning,
Enlightenment rationalism, and neutral principles of constitutional law.”161
Similarly, free speech proponents can criticize Altman’s approach: liberals who favor
free speech for social progress purposes will point to examples when the regulating the content
of even some speech negatively impacts the wrong people. Jonathan Rauch, who is gay and
Jewish, illustrates this point well:
“What is especially dismaying is that the purists pursue prejudice in the name of
protecting minorities. In order to protect people like me (homosexual), they must pursue
people like me (dissident)… In order to bolster minority self-esteem, they suppress
minority opinion… Against the power of ignorant mass opinion and group prejudice and
superstition, we have only our voices.”162
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The free speech advocate will argue that to do justice to all voices, freedom of speech must be
the rule. Rauch mentions a University of Michigan student who was “prosecuted for saying that
homosexuality is a treatable disease.” Rauch urges us to “notice that he was black.”163 Henry
Louis Gates, Jr., laments the fact that under the University of Michigan’s strict speech code,
almost two dozen African Americans were charged with racist speech, while “not a single
instance of white racist speech was punished.”164 Chemerinsky and Gillman argue that speech
codes like this “are often used to punish the speech of people who were not their intended
targets.”165
Socially conscious liberals can mention similar situations that have occurred in many
areas where speech codes were in place: in Florida, where a policeman was called a “white
cracker” by a black man, and in “the first hate-crimes case to reach the Supreme Court” the
“victim was white and the defendant black.”166 As a tool of power, censorship has been
occasionally used in inequitable ways to perpetuate the disparity and oppression of already
disenfranchised groups of people. Efforts to limit what can be said and by whom may backfire
when the censor abuses his/her power or administers justice selectively in response to an overly
broad prohibition against certain words, phrases, or ideas.
Another problematic feature of any moderate proposal is that free speech advocates and
critics of free speech disagree about what constitutes violence, a disagreement that will not likely
be solved with more discussion. The liberal will argue that Altman’s proposal to regulate even a
little speech content can have negative social consequences: the enforcement of speech codes
and policies takes away time and resources from more serious crimes on which we are all agreed:
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actual, physical harm to others. Rauch, for example, harshly criticizes those who equate verbal
harm and physical harm, like a University of Michigan professor of law, who said, “To me,
racial epithets are not speech… They are bullets.”167 Rauch sees similar tendencies in Nobel and
Pulitzer-prize winning novelist Toni Morrison, who said “oppressive language does more than
represent violence; it is violence.” Rauch offers a simple reply to the claim that speech is violent,
“It is not violence.”168
For Rauch, the remedy to situations where fear may drive a person to act irrationally is
not to censor him/her, not to crack “down on words or thoughts” to “pretend that we are doing
something about violence and oppression.”169 The solution to such problems is to crack down on
the violence. Rauch’s point, which illustrates the argument for free speech, is succinct and clear:
“Every cop or prosecutor chasing words is one fewer chasing criminals.”170 This argument
against censorship suggests that there are better, more effective ways to deal with larger, more
threatening problems than censorship. Not only physical assault, but also systemic racism, is
undercut and unaddressed when speech codes get our time and resources. “With so many false
cries of racism around,” Carter says, “it is hardly any wonder that the true examples of racism…
tend to be drowned in the sea of less compelling complaints.”171
Rauch’s defends free speech against attempts to regulate it at all (like Altman), but he is
likely to go unheard by those who begin with different assumptions about what constitutes
violence. Rauch unfortunately provides no argument for the idea that speech acts cannot
constitute violence, and therefore, his position will likely be unsatisfying to those who argue for
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speech restrictions. If the status quo is inherently racist, the problem is more than just the
utterance of certain words or phrases. The reality is racist, according to the aforementioned
contemporary advocates of strict speech codes. The ground on which to have a debate about the
subject are also de facto racist. Altman’s commitment to “viewpoint neutrality” is seen as
precluding any conversation after the fact about the best way to address the situation. Altman’s
essay, nuanced as it is, fails to recognize the implicit and inherent differences the free speech and
restricted speech positions build into the fabric of their positions.
Second, in addition to the fundamental disagreement on a context/content distinction,
progress is impossible given the current state of the debate between free speech proponents and
advocates of restrictive speech codes due to rampant charges of contradictions and selfrefutation. The liberal points out to the censorship advocate that they should recognize the irony
that they are, in no small amount, relying on the very free speech protections they argue against.
This was true of Leaker above. However, this criticism cuts both ways. With free speech as well,
there is a paradox of sorts: on the one hand, the liberal claims, with Mill, that humans are fallible
creatures, ultimately uncertain of any of their intellectual commitments, and yet on the other
hand, they argue that this is the basis for a claim about the primacy of liberty on speech issues,
an objective remark about the best way to address this uncertainty. Obviously, the progressive
nature of knowledge relativizes the liberal prescription for a solution. In the act of making their
arguments for their respective sides, both free speech proponents and advocates of restrictive
speech codes undercut those very arguments. This charge of self-refutation cannot be added as
an argument against censorship without also undercutting advocates of free speech.
Liberals respond to the charge of contradiction, however, by suggesting that another
formulation of it cannot be dismissed so easily. This response, again, has to do with the problem
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of enforcement. Restrictions in speech content would presumably be enforced by campus
administration through punishment, that is, through coercive measures. But as Carter reminds us,
this creates a pragmatic inconsistency, not only on college campuses but in American society at
large: “If it is true that the campuses are hotbeds of racism,” Carter says, “then why would
anyone concerned about racism want to put in the hands of campus authorities the power to
decide what words can and cannot be used?”172 If, as critical race theorists suggest, the status quo
is inherently racist, what sense would it make to give racist authorities the power to silence
dissenters? We should not think so highly of their goals, argues Carter: “To imagine that an
essentially racist authority would wield so extraordinary a power only in the ways that its
dissenters envision is sheer fantasy.”173 On the broader national level, Carter adds in a footnote
that “the theory… was that the state would use its new-found power wisely and in furtherance of
the general good, but matters did not quite work out that way.”174 This brings us to the most
popular criticism of censorship, namely, that regulating the content of speech is a slippery slope,
to which we now turn.
Third, liberals argue that each advocate of censorship has an unsatisfactory response to
the slippery slope argument. As Chemerinsky and Gillman noted above, history shows us that,
on college campuses and in the nation more broadly, we almost always regret imposing
regulations on the content of speech. If one takes the historical argument for free speech
seriously, as free speech proponents argue we should, it is likely that stricter speech codes would
be regretted as well. Free speech advocates ask those in favor of restrictions some hard follow-up
questions: if we were to prevent the most hurtful, bigoted, racist, and morally repugnant ideas
from being uttered, as many of us reasonably want to do, what is next? Would it not then be
172

Carter, Reflections, 177.
Carter, Reflections, 177.
174
Carter, Reflections, 177.
173

65

easier after some censorship is accepted to silence ideas that not only cause harm, but also
outrage or offense? What follows that? Certainly, a society that disallows outrage and offense
does not have to go far to outlaw any speech or ideas that it finds uncomfortable. Would we then
only permit those political or social ideas the masses find acceptable? Wouldn’t we then have
something of the “tyranny of the majority” that worried Mill so much?
Where do we draw the line?, the liberal asks. Certainly not with public officials. In
theory, if we permit lawmakers to decide for us what we can and cannot say, then who is to stop
them from outlawing a word we do believe is necessary to make a social, political, moral,
religious, or pedagogical point? And what is to stop them from going further, say, to outlawing
not only certain expressions, but also certain states of mind or concepts? On the slippery slope’s
telling, the censorship story ends in a state or administration with nearly unlimited power, a
totalitarian regime of Orwellian proportions and the “thought police.” What then separates the
way the United States handles sensitive subjects from China, or worse, North Korea? Granting
additional power to a potential censor and then expecting him not to abuse that power is, as
Carter warns, “sheer fantasy” to the free speech proponent. Feinberg agrees, saying that
regulations “of the strong kind” have “an acrid moral flavor, and creates serious risks of
governmental tyranny.”175
In response to the slippery slope argument, proponents of restrictions on speech argue
that we are already on the slope. We limit speech – in both content and context – every time we
impose rules on who can speak when. Anyone who has been in a conversation in which everyone
is talking over everyone else knows that some restrictions on speech are necessary. Insofar as we
expect others to follow widely accepted rules of discourse in our courts, debates, conversations,
etc., we limit the speech of others. Rightfully so, argue those in favor of speech restrictions. And
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while free speech proponents argue that we need to be ever on guard against governmental
tyranny, Pettit and others disagree with this fundamental assumption, as noted above. Twentyfirst century Americans need not worry about despotism any more. And, of course, the liberal
will respond that we need not worry about it only because we have mechanisms in place to check
governmental power, like free speech, and that our contemporary political liberties like speech
were bought at a price. “Freedom is not free,” they say.
Fourth and finally, the debate between free speech proponents and advocates of
restrictive speech codes devolves to an irreparable and irreconcilable degree when liberals draw
a distinction between harm and offense, so crucial to the positions of Mill and Feinberg. From
the perspective of those who argue for free speech, it seems as if many advocates of censorship
ignore that harm and offense are distinct categories, often conflating the two. No participant in
this debate disagrees with the idea that harm to others is a justifiable reason to limit liberty; on
this point, Mill and Feinberg are in absolute agreement with Matsuda, Lawrence, Fish, Leaker,
Pettit, and Altman. However, free speech proponents suggest that it is often the case that putative
harms experienced by today’s college students are not harms at all. They should be more
appropriately considered “offenses,” which free speech permits. Stephen Carter advocates this
position, when he says,
“I suspect that many of those who fought and died to make it possible for today’s
students of color to have the opportunities they do would have been alarmed at the idea
that this much energy would not go into learning, but into making sure no one says
anything to suggest doubt about our abilities. I am quite sure that the answers our
grandparents would have given is that our response must be to work hard enough to make
ourselves, very simply, too good to ignore… Our parents and their parents fought to
breach the barrier, faced far worse than we must, and won the fight. To honor them… we
have little time to spend chasing down racists and punishing their speech. The barriers are
starting to come down, opportunities are opening up, and there is work to be done.”176
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Carter voices a call to educational excellence as the best response to hateful speech, and he
frames the discussion in light of the history of struggle, literal physical struggle between the
disenfranchised and the powerful. Speech enabled that progress, in Carter’s view. But to call an
offensive word, phrasing, gesture, or costume harmful is an overstatement, for the free speech
advocate, if it has been done peacefully and if the victim is free to leave the situation.
Even some left-leaning, socially conscious proponents of free speech reject the conflation
of harm and offense, and they point to the unique sensitivities of today’s college students as
contributing to the blurred lines. New York University professor, Ulrich Baer, believes that the
term “snowflake” to describe a member of this generation of college students is pejorative and
unfair.177 We got where we are today, he says, through “a thorough generational shift” in which
“personal experience and testimony, especially of suffering and oppression, began to challenge
the primacy of argument.”178 Postmodern philosophical work has, in Baer’s view, served to
“legitimate experience – especially traumatic experience – which has been dismissed for decades
as unreliable, untrustworthy, and inaccessible to understanding.”179 To be sure, Baer presents this
experiential epistemology as a positive development, not a negative one,180 but that
notwithstanding, free speech proponents believe Baer tells us something valuable about the
current generation of college students: they have come to see their experience as just as valuable
as an argument for a specific point of view. They feel the truth of their opinions; therefore, those
opinions are seen as valid.
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Even many (politically) liberal scholars agree that this generation of college students has
a problem seeing their experience as non-normative. And many colleges and universities bend
over backwards to reinforce this self-centered perception by catering the college experience to
that which most maximizes “student satisfaction.”181 If a student is unhappy, s/he believes that
something is wrong with the system or his/her professor, not him/herself. And if a student
perceives that a racist comment has been made, s/he does not need to present a case but rather
rely on his/her subjective feelings of offense. The conflation of harm and offense results in all
sorts of outrageous consequences, from the free speech proponent’s point of view: “I’m a Liberal
Professor, and My Students Terrify Me,” wrote a professor pseudonymously in Vox.182
Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt suggest that there is something new afoot in today’s
college students, probably as a result of their childhood experiences in which adults told them
“life is dangerous, but adults will do everything in their power to protect you.”183 Ours is a
different world than college students faced in the 1990s, and many of the arguments offered in
that decade simply do not apply to a world connected online, as Pettit showed. This generation is
more sensitive than others, subject to “affective partisan polarization,” otherwise expressed as
“morality binds and blinds,” which can have the negative result of preventing clear thinking:
“Acknowledging that the other side’s viewpoint has any merit is risky – your teammates may see
you as a traitor.”184 What is more, higher education has, as Baer noted above, embraced

181

See, e.g., Jack Stripling, “The Lure of the Lazy River,” in The Chronicle of Higher Education, vol. 64:8 (Oct. 15,
2017). Online at: https://www.chronicle.com/article/The-Lure-of-the-Lazy-River/241434.
182
Edward Schlosser, “I’m a Liberal Professor, and my Liberal Students Terrify Me,” in Vox (June 3, 2015). Online
at: https://www.vox.com/2015/6/3/8706323/college-professor-afraid. See Tom Lindsay’s response at:
“Leftist Professors: We Have Met The Enemy, And He Is Us,” in Forbes (June 13, 2015). Online at:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomlindsay/2015/06/13/leftist-professors-we-have-met-the-enemy-and-he-isus/#8528b3b600f5.
183
Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt, “The Coddling of the American Mind,” in The Atlantic (September 2015).
Online at: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/the-coddling-of-the-americanmind/399356/.
184
Lukianoff and Haidt, “The Coddling,” online.

69

“emotional reasoning,” which “will damage their careers and friendships, along with their mental
health.”185 Conflating harm and offense, according to Lukianoff and Haidt, as well as Feinberg,
is dangerous. Feinberg says, “Not everything that we dislike or resent, and wish to avoid, is
harmful to us”186 and “It is not a necessary truth that we are personally wronged by everything at
which we are morally outraged.”187 The problem liberals see with using the university setting as
a place where students are primarily cared for and secondarily educated is that the atmosphere in
no way reflects or prepares students for the harsh realities of life.
Free speech proponents worry that failing to recognize the difference between harm and
offense returns the college or university to the role of a parent. Shortly after the Berkeley Free
Speech movement, as free speech protections were expanding in the U.S., the en loco parentis
doctrine was shrinking, and liberals argue that we would do well not to return to it. This is to say:
it is not at all clear that those who criticize free speech on campuses are aligned with what many
colleges publicly declare to be their social purpose and mission.188 Advocates of restrictive
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speech codes seem to free speech proponents as if they view the college or university as
“protector” of students, that its central goal is to make students feel welcome and never challenge
their pre-existing views.
The liberal believes, however, that the social purpose of a university is not to protect
students from potentially harmful forces or ideas, but rather to prepare them for their postcollege life. Part of this preparation, they argue, is exposing them to views they will encounter
when they leave the university. The solution they offer is exposure to more speech, a more
diverse set of ideas than those we find comfortable (which Haidt and Lukianoff refer to as
“exposure therapy,” or “habituation,” etc.).189 Liberals like Haidt and Lukianoff impress on their
students the idea that “you can never achieve happiness by making the world conform to your
desires. But you can master your desires and habits of thought.”190
However, there is a fundamental disagreement among free speech proponents and
advocates of restrictive speech codes about the nature of the university itself, and about
education more broadly, an intractable debate that juxtaposes protection of students against
preparation of them. Simply put, the use of logic and evidence that “qualifies” as admissible is
rejected by critical race theorists. This is why critical race theorists highly value story-telling as
appropriate and admissible data. “Storytelling is a part of critical race theory,” says LadsonBillings, which “underscores an important point within the critical race theoretical paradigm –
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race still matters.”191 Jacqueline Bridgeman agrees, arguing that advancing positions through
stories permits non-white and non-male participants in the conversation: “We must create space
and the conditions for all voices to be heard. To not only make the invisible visible but to prepare
a place where all can belong. Employing counter narratives in the field of education is one place
where this important work can be done.”192 Delgado also argues for the utility of storytelling as a
tool to counter traditional points of view:
“Stories, parables, chronicles, and narratives are powerful means for destroying mindset –
the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared understandings against a
background of which legal and political discourse takes place. These matters are rarely
focused on. They are like eyeglasses we have worn a long time. They are nearly invisible;
we use them to scan and interpret the world and only rarely examine them for themselves.
Ideology – the received wisdom – makes current social arrangements seem fair and
natural. Those in power sleep well at night-their conduct does not seem to them like
oppression. The cure is storytelling (or, as I shall sometimes call it,
counterstorytelling).”193
Those who argue for stricter speech codes – like those who work in critical race theory – operate
according to a different methodology than those who use academic and/or scholarly tools. That is
to say, there is an impenetrable disagreement on the utility of storytelling for ascertaining or
discovering truth.
The contradictory assumptions and methodologies of free speech proponents and
advocates of restrictive speech codes were on full display when Amy L. Wax, a University of
Pennsylvania Law School professor, wrote an op-ed for the Philadelphia Inquirer. On December
12, 2017, Wax gave a public lecture in which she describes the blowback she received from her
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piece.194 Wax’s op-ed, co-authored with University of California, San Diego law professor, Larry
Alexander, argued that the cultural norms of the 1960s – which prized hard work, civic
responsibility, education, marriage, etc. – were better suited to engender a productive and
cohesive society than the norms of today, evidenced in staggering statistics in a number of
categories: single parenthood, drug epidemics, rampant illiteracy, violence, etc. Their most
controversial passage made the claim that “cultures are not equal in terms of preparing people to
be productive citizens in a modern technological society,”195 singling out elements of Native
American, poor white, black, and Hispanic cultures. In response, the free speech proponent
would argue that we should subject claims like these to debate to assess their validity. Wax says
this would be “the proper response… to attempt to explain, using logic, evidence, facts, and
substantive arguments, why these opinions are wrong.”196
But this is not the response Wax received, even from many of her Penn colleagues. She
received letters, emails, statements, and petitions that “condemned the piece as racist, white
supremacist, hate speech, heteropatriarchal, xenophobic, etc.”197 Students and faculty members
alike demanded her resignation, or at least her removal from committees. Notably, however, they
demanded these responses without substantively engaging the argument and evidence of the oped. Some of her colleagues described their piece as an “attack” that would “damage” their
institution; others “invited students… to monitor” her “and to report any ‘stereotyping and bias’
they might experience or perceive.”198 In one of the few instances when an attempt at an actual
argument was made against Wax and Alexander, the charge was “the sin of praising the 1950s –
194
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a decade when racial discrimination was openly practiced and opportunities for women were
limited.”199 Others accused Wax of speaking in “code” as a “dog whistle” for Nazism.
The knee-jerk hostility Wax faced is anathema to rational deliberation, according to the
liberal free speech proponent, but the swift response was not perceived as unfounded at all for
those who view the status quo as already racist. The situation has caused Wax to rethink her
position on the proper rules of debate. “Of course one has the right to hurl labels like ‘racist,’
‘sexist,’ and ‘xenophobic’ without good reason – but that doesn’t make it the right thing to do.
Hurling such labels doesn’t enlighten, inform, edify, or educate. Indeed, it undermines these
goals by discouraging or stifling dissent.”200 Reflecting later on the events, Wax makes clear why
free speech proponents and advocates of restrictive speech codes will not make progress on this
debate:
“The charge that a statement is ‘code’ for something else, or a ‘dog whistle’ of some kind
– we frequently hear this charged leveled, event against people who are stating
demonstrable facts – is unanswerable. It is like accusing a speaker of causing emotional
injury or feelings of marginalization. Using this kind of language, which students have
learned to do all too well, is intended to bring discussion and debate to a stop – to silence
speech deemed unacceptable.”201
Wax’s insight reveals the deep division in discussions of regulating race-related speech on
college campuses. Conversation cannot move forward if one side pre-emptively throws ad
hominem bombs into the mix, of which those on the far right and far left are guilty. This, of
course, means that those advocating speech restrictions are reaching their desired goals: in
making the charge of racism, they blunt further conversation and end up silencing the speech
they find distasteful.
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In Wax’s view, the stakes could not be higher: “Democracy thrives on talk and debate,
and it is not for the faint of heart… Offense and upset go with the territory; they are part and
parcel of an open society. We should be teaching our young people to get used to these things,
but instead we are teaching them the opposite.”202
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CONCLUSION
This, of course, brings us to some very uncomfortable questions, to which this essay can
but gesture. Should scholarship still depend on reason, evidence, logic, and argument to ascertain
truth? What should be done in situations where someone uses these tools well, but in service of
an uncomfortable or politically incorrect conclusion? What if an argument is well-supported but
the conclusion to which the author drives is not only uncomfortable but also socially dangerous?
What if the truth actually is offensive? What if the point of view a controversial speaker espouses
is true, and that truth undermines our cherished commitment to equality? What if the
advancement of knowledge and social progress, so central to the free speech proponent’s
argument for maximizing liberty, do not always work together and can be, in some situations, at
odds with one another? What if the advancement of knowledge limits social progress?
Scholars enter socially dangerous territory when they evaluate race-related arguments and
counterarguments. With respect to the two cases mentioned by the free speech proponents above
– Herrnstein and Murray’s The Bell Curve and Shockley’s Stanford address – some scholars
continued to debate these matters, despite their social unacceptability. In 1994, over fifty
signatories signed a statement for the Wall Street Journal in which they rebuffed “conclusions
dismissed in the media as discredited,”203 chief among them the issue of racial intelligence.
These scholars were careful to acknowledge that there are a variety of causes and conditions for
racial disparity, but they also believe that “intelligence… can be measured, and intelligence tests
203
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measure it well.”204 Nor are those tests “culturally biased against American blacks or other
native-born, English-speaking peoples in the U.S.… IQ scores predict equally accurately for all
such Americans, regardless of race and social class.”205 The signatories proceeded to give racerelated results on those tests, which puts “Jews and East Asians” at the upper ends of the
spectrum and all others – whites, blacks, etc. – below them.
In an environment where arguments have the potential to threaten and harm entire groups
of people; where some ideas will have negative social consequences; where no one is ultimately
unbiased enough to get a fair hearing from both of the opposing sides; in situations like these,
one wonders whether the best option is simply to not engage in scholarship of this type. Philip
Kitcher rejects “race” as a suitable category of scholarly exploration for precisely these reasons
and instead favors a more “democratic science” in the face of “subversive truths.”206 Every
scholar and every piece of scholarship is hopelessly value-laden. Perhaps, then, not all
knowledge is beneficial:
“There are vast oceans of truth that aren’t worth exploring, and so the thesis must give
way to the more plausible claim that it is always better for us to know significant truths.
If there is no context-independent notion of significance, and epistemic significance is
intertwined with past and present practical projects, then we cannot set the value of
apprehending significant truths on some ‘higher’ plane, so that inquiry must inevitably
take precedence over everyday concerns.”207
Racial categories, when explored or exploited by those in ivory towers, can contribute to social
unrest and inequality.208 The free speech proponent, who argues for the necessity of the
exploration, and advocates of strict speech codes, who argue that the inquiry itself is racist, “pull
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in different directions.” So a “responsible verdict on the notion of race must await the elaboration
of information about all the uses, their consequences, and the prospects of doing better without
racial categories.”209 Therefore, “continued viability of these notions should not be decided by
any group of academic researchers” and doing so for reasons of the “independence of scientific
inquiry rings hollow.”210 The concept of “race” as a subject of scientific or scholarly activity
would require “ideal deliberators,” but ideal deliberators do not presently exist, for “there are
considerations pulling in different directions.”211
My goal in this essay has been to explain how these incompatibilities arise, why there
seems to be an impasse that university cannot move past. This required hearing the positions of
each position and presenting how the other side would respond. I suggested throughout that if
progress is to be made, either or both of the two sides will need to reconsider three fundamental
features of their argument: first, their starting point, whether the status quo is inherently racist
and whether view-point neutrality is possible; second, what methodology is appropriate to these
complex issues, storytelling or the traditional tools of argument and evidence; and third, whether
and to what extent the fundamental values that animate these positions – liberty or equality – are
compatible. Thus far, neither side seems willing to hear the other out in ways that do justice to
the original positions, except for moderates who, unfortunately, are attacked from both sides.
Until more scholars seek common ground, or until those seeking common ground are
given a fair hearing by those on both sides, further dialogue is of little use. Free speech
proponents strive to maximize liberty as a prerequisite for other liberties, even to the point of
accepting terrible uses of it. “University student groups may express any viewpoint they wish,”
says a recent court opinion, “including a discriminatory one, for the court [is] committed to
209
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protecting the freedom to express the thought that we hate.”212 Liberals worry about regulating
the thought that we hate, for no governmental or university administrator should be empowered
to regulate ideas and the expression of those ideas in speech. Conversely, advocates of restrictive
speech codes argue that harm – literal, real harm – is being done while liberals remain aloof in
their debates, disconnected from the real world stories of struggle among those who are already
disenfranchised in society. Their responses take issue with the thought that we hate, and they
intend to use their platform not just to rebalance the scales, but to swing the pendulum in their
direction as reparation.
The issue of speech is personal for me. Since the Charlottesville event, I have come to
appreciate and seek remedies for natural self-deceptive strategies present in all of us at some
level, and nowhere is this more apparent than in confirmation bias. While I resonate with the
liberal’s claim that the best cure for confirmation bias is exposure to new data, new ways of
thinking, and unfamiliar ways of life, doing so will mean attending and listening to those who
suggest that the status quo is already, inherently, fundamentally, and essentially racist. This essay
has been an exercise in hearing both sides out. But I am not hopeful about the contemporary state
of the conversation, and I worry both sides are too entrenched to take meaningful steps toward
unity.
This essay is part of a growing body of literature aimed at explicating the current
dilemma on speech issues. The contribution it makes is illustrating to both sides why they may
not be as effective as they would like in changing hearts and minds. The field on which speech
212
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conversations take place may shift soon, however. The same Gallup Poll that surveyed today’s
college students and found them inhospitable to hate speech also surveyed high school students.
The results were surprising, for high school students are, on the whole, comfortable with
accepting and promoting the value of free speech and the First Amendment in particular.213
Therefore, we can expect that, at least for the next few years, the issue will remain contested and
contestable. Today’s high school students are tomorrow’s college students, and they will be
influenced by scholars on both sides of the issue, perhaps even adding their own voices to the
conversation.
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